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I. INTRODUCTION
The Uniform Trust Code (2000) ("UTC") is the first effort by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to provide the states with
a comprehensive model for codifying their law on trusts. This Article provides
an overview of the UTC, describes how it responds to recent developments in
American trust practice, and describes how its enactment would change the trust
law prevailing in most American states.' The final text of the UTC was
approved by the Commissioners in August 2000, and by the American Bar
Association's House ofDelegates at its mid-yearmeeting in February 2001. The
detailed interpretive comments were completed in April 2001, and minor
cleanup amendments were approved in August 2001.2 Enactment by the
American states is expected to begin in 2002.
The drafting of the UTC was prompted by the much greater use of trusts in
recent years. This greater use of the trust, and consequent rise in the number of
day-to-day questions involving trusts, led to a recognition by the Commissioners
that the trust law in most states is thin, with many gaps between the often few
statutes and reported cases. It also led to a recognition that previous uniform acts
relating to trusts, while numerous, are fragmentary. The primary source of trust
law in most other states is the Restatement of Trusts and the multivolume
treatises by Scott3 and Bogert,4 sources that fail to address numerous practical
issues and that on others sometimes provide insufficient guidance. The purpose
of the UTC is to update, fill out, and systematize the American law of trusts.
The UTC will enable states that enact it to specify their rules on trust law with
precision and in a readily-available source. Finally, while much of the UTC
codifies the common law, the UTC makes some significant changes.5 While the
UTC is the first comprehensive uniform act on the subject of trusts,
comprehensive trust statutes are already in effect in several states, with the
statutes in California6 and Texas7 being the most widely known.

1. For another perspective, emphasizing somewhat different issues, see John H.

Langbein, The Uniform Trust Code: Codification of the Law of Trusts in the United
States, 13 TR. L. INT'L 66 (2001).

2. The complete text of the Uniform Trust Code (2000) [hereinafter UTC] with
comments can be accessed through the Commissioners' website, http://www.nccusl.org.
3. AUSTIN WAKEMAN ScoTt & WILLIAM FRANKLn FRATCHER, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS (4th ed. 1987).
4. GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES (rev. 2d ed. 1977).

5. See supra note 2.
6. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 15000-18201 (West 1991 & Supp. 2001).
7. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. chs. 111-115 (Vernon 1995 & Supp. 2002).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/2
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The UTC was drafted by a committee chaired by Maurice Hartnett, a
Justice on the Delaware Supreme Court and former Judge of the Delaware
Chancery Court with long experience with trust cases. This Author served as
Reporter with responsibility for carrying out the drafting committee's decisions
on a day-to-day basis and for preparing the various drafts. The drafting
committee was assisted by numerous advisors, most of whom attended a
majority of the twice-annual drafting committee meetings. Groups represented
included the American Bar Association and its Section of Real Property Probate
and Trust Law (three advisors), the American College of Trust and Estate
Counsel ("ACTEC"), the American Bankers Association, andthe California and
Colorado State Bars. Key advice was also provided by the Joint Editorial Board
for Uniform Trusts and Estates Acts and the ACTEC Committee on State Laws.
The drafting of the UTC was a seven-year process. A study committee,
chaired by Judge Hartnett, was initially appointed in 1993. The function of the
study committee was to decide whether the Commissioners should undertake the
drafting of a comprehensive uniform law on trusts. The study committee
recommended the appointment of a drafting committee, which was appointed in
1994. To gather as much input as possible, the drafting of the UTC was
deliberately not placed on the fast track, but spanned a period of six years.
I. RELATED UNIFORM ACTS
There are numerous existing uniform acts on trusts andrelated subjects, but
none provide comprehensive coverage on trust law issues. Certain of these
smaller acts are incorporated into the UTC; others should be repealed upon
enactment ofthe UTC. Still others, addressing specialized topics, will continue
to be available for enactment in free-standing form. Certain ofthese smaller acts
are incorporated into the larger UTC. The most important ofthese other uniform
acts is the 1994 Uniform Prudent Investor Act, enacted in thirty-six states.' That
Act codifies the Restatement (Third) of Trusts: PrudentInvestorRule (1992).
The Uniform Prudent Investor Act prescribes a trustee's responsibilities with
regard to the management and investment of trust property. The UTC expands
on this by also specifying the trustee's duties regarding distributions to
beneficiaries. Given its importance and already widespread acceptance, the
UTC does not modify the smaller Uniform Prudent Investor Act but incorporates
it without change."

8. For the text of the act and citations for the enacting jurisdictions, see UNIF.
PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT, 7B U.L.A. 280 (2000 & Supp. 2001).
9. UTC art. 9 general cnt.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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Uniform acts superceded by the UTC are Article VII of the Uniform
Probate Code ("UPC"), ° the Uniform Trustee Powers Act (1964)," and the
Uniform Trusts Act (1937). 12 Uniform acts on trust-related topics that are not
superceded by the UTC and are still available for enactment include the Uniform
Common Trust Fund Act, 3 Uniform Custodial Trust Act (1987),11 Uniform
Management of Institutional Funds Act (1972)," Uniform Principal and Income

10. 8 U.L.A. pts. I & 1 (1998). Article VII, although titled Trust Administration,
is a modest statute, addressing only a limited number of topics. Its provisions on
jurisdiction are incorporated into Article 2 of the UTC, and its provision on trustee
liability to persons other than beneficiaries is replaced by Section 1010. Its provisions
on trust registration are not supplanted by the UTC. Registration is a method for
recording a trust in the county records. The UTC drafters concluded that it was best not
to address trust registration.
11. For the text of this Act and citations for the sixteen states that have enacted it,
see UNIF. TRUSTEE POWERS ACT (1964), 7C U.L.A. 388(2000). This Act contains a list
of specific trustee powers and deals with other selected issues, particularly relations of
a trustee with persons other than beneficiaries. The Uniform Trustee Powers Act is
outdated and is entirely superseded by the UTC, principally at Sections 815, 816, and
1012.
12. Despite its name, this much earlier Act addressed only a limited number of
topics, including the duty of loyalty, registration and voting of securities, and trustee
liability to persons other than beneficiaries. For the text of this earlier Act and citations
for the seven states that have enacted it, see UNIF. TRUSTS ACT, 7C U.L.A. 436 (2000).
13. Originally approved in 1938, this Act has been enacted in thirty-four
jurisdictions. The UTC does not address the subject of common trust funds. In recent
years, many banks have replaced their common trust funds with mutual funds that also
may be available to non-trust customers. The UTC addresses investment in mutual funds
at Section 802(t). For the text of the Uniform Common Trust Fund Act and citations for
the jurisdictions that have enacted it, see UNIF. COMMON TRUST FUND ACT, 7 U.L.A. pt.
II, at 181 (1997).
14. This Act allows standard trust provisions to be automatically incorporated into
the terms of a trust simply by referring to the Act in the instrument. This Act is not
displaced by the UTC but complements it. For the text of the Uniform Custodial Trust
Act and citations for the fifteen jurisdictions that have enacted it, see UNIF. CUSTODIAL
TRUST ACT, 7A U.L.A. pt. 1, at 239 (1999 & Supp. 2001).
15. This Act governs the administration of endowment funds held by charitable,
religious, educational, or other eleemosynary institutions. It establishes a standard of
prudence for use of appreciation on assets, provides specific authority for the making of
investments, authorizes the delegation of this authority, and specifies a procedure,
through either donor consent or court approval, for removing restrictions on the use of
donated funds. For the text ofthe Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act and
citations for the forty-seven jurisdictions that have enacted it, see UNIF. MGMT. OF
INSTrTUTIONAL FUNDS ACT, 7A U.L.A. pt. 2, at 475 (1999 & Supp. 2001).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/2

4

English: English:Uniform Trust Code (2000):

2002]

UTC (2000)

Act (1997),16 Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities,17 and the Uniform
Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act.

III. RELATIONSHIP TO THE RESTATEMENT
Restatements, which are written and approved by a national body of
lawyers comprising the members of the American Law Institute ("ALr'), serve
a proactive role close to that of uniform acts. A Restatement is more than a
document that collects and summarizes, in one place, the common law on a
particular subject. Rather, where the decisions of the courts conflict, a
Restatement strives to delineate the better rule. It also tries to fill in gaps in the
law, to promote the rule the courts should apply when it encounters an issue for
the first time. The hope is that the courts of the different states, by relying on the
Restatementas aprimary guide for decision, will adopt uniform rules of decision
over time.
The Restatement (Second) of Trusts was approved by the ALI in 1957.1'
Beginning in the late 1980s, work on the Restatement Thirdbegan. The portiol
of the Restatement Third relating to the prudent investor rule and other
investment topics was completed and approved in 1990.20 A tentative draft of
the portion of the Restatement Third relating to the rules on the creation and

16. This is a major revision of the widely enacted uniform act of the same name
that was last revised in 1962. Because the Uniform Principal and Income Act addresses
issues with respect both to decedents' estates and trusts, a jurisdiction enacting the
revised act may wish to codify it either as part of the UTC or as part of its probate laws.
17. Originally approved in 1986, this Act reforms the durational limit on when
property interests, including interests created under trusts, must vest or fail. The UTC
does not limit the duration of trusts or alter the time when interests otherwise must vest,
but leaves this issue to other state law. The UTC may be enacted without change
regardless of the status of the perpetuities law in the enacting jurisdiction. For the text
of the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities and citations for the twenty-six

jurisdictions that have enacted it, see UNIF. STATUTORYRULEAGAINSTPERPEurTIES, 8B
U.L.A. 223 (2001).
18. This Act is available in two versions: the 1960 Act, with twenty-five
enactments; and the 1991 Act, with twenty-one enactments. As its name suggests, the
Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act validates pourover devises to trusts.
Because it validates provisions in wills, it is incorporated into the Uniform Probate Code
("UPC"),not into the UTC. For the text ofthe two versions ofthe UniformTestamentary
Additions to Trusts Act and citations for the jurisdictions that have enacted it, see UNIF.
TESTAMENTARY ADDITIONS TO TRUSTS ACT (1960), 8B U.L.A. 367 (2001); UNIF.
TESTAMENTARY ADDITIONS TO TRUSTS AT (1991), 8B U.L.A. 355 (2001).
19. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS (1959).
20. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE (1992).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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validity of trusts was approved in 1996;21 the portion relating to the office of
trustee, trust purposes, spendthrift provisions, and the rights of creditors was
approved in 1999;' and the portion on termination and modification of trusts
was approved in 2001.'
The UTC was drafted in close coordination with this revision of the
Restatement ofTrusts to the extent that a significant minority, if not majority, of
the UTC provisions could be described as a codification of the Restatement.
Less important but still influential was coordination with the revision of the
Restatement (Third)ofProperty: Wills andOtherDonative Transfers,in which
much of the law on voluntary transfer of property, both during life and at death,
is collected and on which several sections of the UTC are based. 4 The portions
of this other Restatement dealing with interpretation of documents are relevant
whether the document in question is a will, inter vivos trust, or other form of
nonprobate transfer.
Restatements are not statutes. Until accepted by the courts of a particular
state, the courts are free to, and often do, adopt a different rule. By contrast,
uniform acts, when enacted, become mandatory rules of law that can be relied
on and are easily accessible to all of a state's citizens, whether or not they are in
front of the courts. The UTC thus will serve an important educational function.
For the first time, legal practitioners in many states actually will be able to
determine their state's law on trusts. Furthermore, there are numerouspractical
issues that are best addressed by specific legislation, such as the UTC, instead
of by a more discretionary guideline, such -as a Restatement.
IV. RELATIONSHIP TO THE COMMON LAW
The UTC is supplemented by the common law of trusts, including
principles of equity.' The Restatement of Trusts is the most complete and
readily-available reference in which to locate this common law. The common
law of trusts is not static but includes the contemporary and evolving rules of
decision developed by the courts in the exercise of their power to adapt the law
to new situations and changing conditions. It also includes the traditional and

21. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996).
22. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999).
23. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2001).

24. See UTC § 414 (titled reformation to correct mistakes and based on
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1

(Tentative Draft No. 1, 1995)); UTC § 415 (titled modification to achieve settlor's tax
objectives and based on RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY:

WILLS & OTHER

DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.2 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1995)).

25. UTC § 106.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/2
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broad equitable jurisdiction of the court, which the UTC in no way restricts.2 6
The statutory text of the UTC is also supplemented by its comments, which, like
the comments to any uniform act, may be relied on as a guide for interpretation?
V. SCOPE OF COVERAGE
The UTC states the law relating to express trusts.? These are trusts created
by settlors who during life or at death transfer property to a trustee or who during
their lifetime declare themselves trustee of their own property.' Following its
creation, the trustee then will hold the property for the benefit of beneficiaries.
This is to be distinguished from what are known as resulting or constructive
trusts, which are remedial devices imposed by the courts."
Trusts are best known in the United States as a device for planning an
individual's personal estate. Trusts are created as a way to reduce estate and gift
taxes. They are used to hold property for the benefit of minors and for adults
with disabilities. They are used to provide benefits to a spouse for life, with the
assurance that upon the spouse's death the property held in trust will pass to
children of a prior marriage. But trusts also are increasingly being used as tools
for facilitating commercial transactions. In fact, in the United States, wealth held
in commercial trusts far exceeds that transmitted through trusts created to
manage family gifts. Examples of commercial transactions where the use of
trusts is prevalent, if not predominant, include pension funds, mutual funds for
3
pooling investment assets, and trusts to secure repayment of corporate debt.
The UTC is not directed specifically at commercial trusts but neither does it
exclude them. The extent to which commercial trusts will be subject to the Code
will depend on the type of trust and the laws, other than the UTC, under which
the trust was created. Even if the commercial trust is governed exclusively by

26. UTC § 106 cmt.
27. See YaleUniv. v. Blumenthal, 621 A.2d 1304,1307 (Conn. 1993) (interpreting
the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act); Aciemo v. Worthy Bros. Pipeline
Corp., 656 A.2d 1085, 1090 (Del. 1995) (interpreting the Uniform Commercial Code);
JACK DAVIES, LEGISLATIVE LAW AND PROCESS IN A NUTSHELL § 55-4 (2d ed. 1986); 2
NORMAN SINGER, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 52.05 (6th ed. 2000).
28. See UTC § 102.
29. See UTC § 401.
30. See UTC § 102 cmt. For the law on resulting trusts, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TRUSTS § § 7-9 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996). For the law on constructive trusts, see
5 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§
461-529 (4th ed. 1989), and 5A AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN
FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 530-552 (4th ed. 1987).
31. John H. Langbein, The Secret Life ofthe Trust: The Trust as an Instrumentof
Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165, 168-74 (1997).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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another body of law, the courts are free to look to the UTC for interpretive
guidance.
VI. OVERVIEW OF PROVISIONS
The breadth of the UTC is indicated by its organization. The UTC is
organized into eleven articles. Article 1, in addition to providing definitions,
addresses topics such as the ability of a trust instrument to override the UTC's
provisions,32 the validity of choice of law provisions and the law to govern in the
absence of such a provision,33 and the procedure for transferring the principal
place of administration to another jurisdiction.34 Article 2 addresses selected

topics involving judicial proceedings concerning trusts. Included is the
conferring ofjurisdiction on the court to intervene in a trust's administration,3"
specification of the court's jurisdiction over trustees and beneficiaries,36 and
optional provisions on subject-matter jurisdiction37 and venue.38 This minimal
coverage was deliberate; the drafting committee concluded that most issues
relating to jurisdiction and procedure before the courts are best left to other
bodies of law, such as the rules of civil procedure. Even among those provisions
that remain, local conditions may dictate modification. The optional provision
on venue may conflict with the local jurisdiction's general venue rules. The
provision on subject-matter jurisdiction was designed for ajurisdiction in which
one category of court, such as a chancery court, has exclusive jurisdiction over
proceedings concerning the administration of any type of trust, whether inter
vivos or testamentary.
Most of the topics addressed in Articles 3 through 7 are discussed in detail
below. Article 3 deals with the important topic of representation of
beneficiaries, including virtual representation and representation by fiduciaries,
specifying circumstances when another person, such as a guardian, may receive
notice or give a consent on behalf of the beneficiary or other person represented.
Article 4, which is the first article of the UTC devoted to the substantive law of
trusts, prescribes the requirements for creating, modifying, and terminating

32. UTC § 105.
33. UTC § 107. For an analysis of this provision, see Eugene F. Scoles, Choice
of Law in Trusts: Unifonn Trust Code, Sections 107 and 403, 67 Mo. L. Ruv. 213
(2002).
34.
35.
36.
37.

§ 108.
§ 201.
§ 202.
§ 203.
38. UTC § 204.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/2
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trusts. The provisions on the creation of trusts" largely track traditional
doctrine; those relating to modification and termination' liberalize the prevailing
law. Article 5 covers spendthrift provisions and rights of creditors, both of the
settlor and beneficiaries. Article 6 collects the special rules relating to revocable
trusts, including the standard of capacity,4 the procedure for revocation or
modification,42 and the statute of limitations on contests.43 Article 7 turns to the
office oftrustee, specifying numerous procedural rules that apply absent contrary
provision in the trust. Included are the rules on trustee acceptance," the rights
and obligations of cotrustees, 5 the procedure for resignation," the grounds for
removal,47 the methods for appointing successors, 4 and trustee compensation.49
Article 8 details the duties and powers of the trustee. The trustee's
administrative powers 0 are an updated version of the Uniform Trustee Powers
Act, including coverage of such current topics as the power to deal with
environmental hazards. Statutory powers allay concerns by third parties as to
whether the trustee has the authority to engage in a particular transaction. The
trustee duties contained in Article 8, such as the duty of loyalty, 51 largely codify
the common law and were drafted where relevant to conform to the Uniform
Prudent Investor Act. 52 The Uniform Prudent Investor Act prescribes a trustee's

39. UTC §§ 401-409.
40. UTC §§ 410-417.
41. UTC § 601.
42. UTC § 602.
43. UTC § 604.
44. UTC § 701.
45. UTC § 703.
46. UTC § 705.
47. UTC § 706.
48. UTC § 704.
49. UTC § 708.
50. UTC §§ 815-816.
51. UTC § 802. For an analysis of this provision and the duty of loyalty more
generally, see Karen E. Boxx, OfPunctiliosandPaybacks: The Duty ofLoyalty Under
the Uniform Trust Code, 67 Mo. L. REV. 279 (2002).
52. UTC prefatory note. Other duties addressed in Article 8 are the duty to
administer the trust (Section 801), the duty of impartiality (Section 803), the duty to act
with prudence (Section 804), the duty to minimize costs (Section 805), the duty to
exercise skills (Section 806), duties with respect to delegation (Section 807), duties with
respect to powers to direct (Section 808), the duty to control and protect trust property
(Section 809), the duty to earmark (Section 810), the duty to enforce and defend claims
(Section 811), the duty to collect trust property (Section 812), the duty to inform and
report (discussed infranotes 234-43 and accompanying text), and duties with respect to
discretionary powers over distributions (Section 814). Sections 804, 806, and 807 are
drawn from and are similar to comparable sections ofthe Uniform Prudent Investor Act.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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responsibilities with regard to the management and investment of trust
property. 3 The UTC expands on this by also specifying the trustee's duties
regarding distributions to beneficiaries. 4
Article 9 provides a place for the jurisdiction enacting the larger UTC to
codify its version of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act. Article 10 addresses
liability of trustees and trustee dealings with persons other than beneficiaries.
With respect to the liability of a trustee for breach of trust, the Article lists the
remedies for breach of trust;"5 specifies how money damages are to be
determined; 6 provides that the court, in judicial proceedings relating to the
administration of the trust, may award attorney's fees against the trustee, the
trust, or even a beneficiary, as justice and equity may require; and specifies
certain trustee defenses, including the addition of a statute of limitations for
claims alleging breach of trust 8 and a provision on enforcing exculpatory
clauses.5 9 With respect to transactions by trustees with third persons, Article 10
treats trustees as if they were managers of entities, and encourages trustees and
third persons to engage in commercial transactions to the same extent as if no
trust were involved.6 Addressed are personal liability of the trustee for contract
or tort and the rights of bona fide purchasers. 6' To protect the privacy of the
trust, a procedure is provided whereby a trustee may verify authority by means
of a certificate instead of by providing the third person with a copy of the trust
instrument. 62
Article 11 deals with the application of the UTC to existing trusts. The
intent is to give the Code the widest possible application, consistent with
limitations placed on it by the United States Constitution.63 Consequently, the
UTC generally applies not only to trusts created on or after the effective date, but
also to trusts already in existence."

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

See UNWF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT, 7B U.L.A. 280 (2000).
UTC art. 8 general cmt.
UTC § 1001.
UTC § 1002.
UTC § 1004.
UTC § 1005.
UTC § 1008.
UTC prefatory note.
UTC §§ 1010-1012.
UTC § 1013.
UTC prefatory note.
UTC§ 1106 &cmt.
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VII. STUDY PROCESS

States normally enact major unifom laws only following a lengthy study
process. The following are issues for states to consider:
1. PrepareStateLaw Study. The first step is to determine how enactment
of the UTC would change existing law, both statutes and case law.
With respect to case law, most courts rely heavily on the Restatementof
Trusts, on which the UTC also places major reliance.
2. Decide on DraftingModel. One approach is to start with the UTC as a
base and then to make necessary modifications. The other approach is
to begin with existing law and then to add selected provisions of the
Code. Relying on the UTC as the starting point will result in greater
consistency with other states. Such reliance also will reduce the risk of
gaps and inconsistencies.
3. Decide What to Do About OptionalProvisions. Certain sections of the
UTC are placed in brackets to signal that modification may be
appropriate. The reasons why modification of a section may be
appropriate are then discussed in the comments to the bracketed
sections. Sections of the UTC containing bracketed language include
the provisions on rules of construction," subject-matter jurisdiction and
venue," and contest of revocable trusts.Y
4. Decide What to Do About the Uniform PrudentInvestorAct. Article 9
of the UTC provides a place for an enacting jurisdiction to insert its
version of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act. The comment to that
Article provides instructions on how to eliminate overlap between the
Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the provisions of UTC Article 8
describing the fiduciary duties ofa trustee. An enacting jurisdiction will
need to determine whether to leave its version of the Prudent Investor
Act where it is or to codify it as part of the UTC.
5. Accommodate Variations in Local Court Systems. In many states,
testamentary trusts are within the jurisdiction of the probate court, with
one set of rules and pocedures, while inter vivos trusts are within the
jurisdiction of a court of equity, with yet another set of rules and

65. UTC § 112. For a discussion, see infranote 114 and accompanying text.
66. UTC §§ 203-204.
67. UTC § 604. For a discussion, see infra notes 198-202 and accompanying text.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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procedures. The UTC, being a uniform act, cannot accommodate all
local variations.
6. Decide on Other Key Local Law Issues. Certain existing local law

provisions or practices may be so well established that change may be
unwise.6"
7. Identify Other Policy and Political Issues.

These will vary by

jurisdiction and by who controls the drafting process. Issues on which
the Commissioners had divided votes often will result in split votes
when the debate moves to the states. To encourage uniformity, the
Commissioners request that state drafting committees start from the
assumption that the uniform law approach is correct. Many of these
significant policy issues are discussed below.
VIII. POLICY ISSUES
The UTC does not make sweeping changes in the common law of trusts,
but neither does it woodenly copy the previous judge-made law. The UTC
makes significant strides. What follows is a description of the more important
changes made by the UTC in the rules prevailing in most states. These are also
the issues likely to receive the most discussion when the UTC is considered by
the states. The following are the issues addressed:
1. Default Rules (Section 105);
2. Principal Place of Administration (Section 108);
3. Representation and Settlements (Section 111 and Article 3);
4. Rules of Construction (Section 112);
5. Creation of Trusts (Sections 401-409);
6. Trust Modification and Termination (Sections 410-417);
7. Charitable Trusts (Sections 405, 413);
8. Spendthrift Provisions and Rights of Beneficiary's Creditors (Article 5);
9. Revocable Trusts (Article 6);
10. Cotrustees (Section 703);
11. Trustee Removal (Section 706);
12. Duty to Keep the Beneficiaries Informed (Section 813);
13. Remedies for Breach of Trust (Sections 1001-1009); and

68. For an analysis of the Missouri trust law provisions most likely to be carried
forward into Missouri's enactment of the UTC, see Scot Boulton, How Uniform Will the
Uniform Trust CodeBe: VagariesofMissouri Trust Law Versus DesiresforConformity,

67 Mo. L. REv. 361 (2002).
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14. Trustee Dealings with Third Persons (Sections 1010-1013).
A. Default Rules (Section 105)
Most of American trust law consists of rules subject to override by the
terms ofthe trust. The UTC is no exception. Nearly all ofthe Code'sprovisions
are subject to override by the terms of the trust. But prior to the UTC, neither
the Restatement, nor treatise writers, nor state legislatures had attempted to
describe the principles of law that are not subject to the settlor's control. The
UTC collects these principles in Section 105. Included are the requirements for
creating a trust;69 the rights of third parties in their dealings with the trustee;70 the
power of the court to take certain actions with respect to a trust's administration
such as to remove a trustee;7 the power of the court to modify or terminate a
trust on specified grounds;72 a trustee's obligation to act in good faith and in
accordance with the purposes of the trust;73 the requirement that a trust and its
terms be for the benefit of its beneficiaries;74 and the trustee's duty to keep the
adult beneficiaries age twenty-five and older informed ofcertain matters relating
to the trust's administration.7" The limits on the settlor's ability to waive the duty
to keep the beneficiaries informed, which is described in detail below,7 6 is the
most discussed provision of the UTC.
B. PrincipalPlace ofAdministration (Section 108)
Determining a trust's principal place of administration is important for a
variety of reasons. It may determine which state's income tax applies to the
trust.77 It will establish which court has primary jurisdiction concerning trust
administrative matters78 or venue for bringing a proceeding.79 Locating a

69. UTC § 105(b)(1).
70. UTC § 105(b)(1 1).
71. UTC § 105(b)(13).
72. UTC § 105(b)(4). Fortheprovisions on trust modification andtermination, see
UTC §§ 410-417 (discussed infra notes 140-59 and accompanying text).
73. UTC § 105(b)(2).
74. UTC § 105(b)(3).
75. UTC § 105(b)(8)-(9).
76. See UTC § 105 (b)(8)-(b)(9); see also infra notes 244-46 and accompanying
text.
77. For the effect of place of administration on the state's authority to tax a trust,
seeBradleyE.S. Fogel, What Have You DoneforMeLately? ConstitutionalLimitations
on State Taxation of Trusts, 32 U. RICH. L. REV.165 (1998).
78. See UTC § 202(a) ("By accepting the trusteeship of atrust having its principal

place of administration in this State or by moving the principal place of administration
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principal place of administration in a particular jurisdiction also makes it more
likely that the particular jurisdiction's law will govern the trust.80
As trust administration has become more complex, determining a trust's
principal place of administration has become more difficult. Cotrustees may be
located in different states, or a corporate trustee's personal trust officers may be
located in one state, its investment division in another, and its operations
facilities yet somewhere else. Also, a variety of nontrustees, such as advisors
and trust protectors, may play a role in the trust's administration. Concluding
that the fact situations were simply too diverse to allow the development of a
straightforward statutory test, the drafters of the UTC did not attempt to define
principal place of administration.8 1 Nevertheless, the UTC otherwise facilitates
the locating of a trust in a particular jurisdiction. First, a provision in the trust
terms designating the principal place of administration is valid and controlling
if a trustee's principal place of business is located in or a trustee is a resident of
the designated jurisdiction, or all or part of the trust's administration occurs in
the designated place. 2 Second, for trust instruments failing to address the

to this State, the trustee submits personally to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State
regarding any matter involving the trust.").
79. Under UTC Section 204, which is one ofthe Code's optional provisions, venue
for bringing a proceeding is in the county of the trust's principal place of administration
unless the trust has no trustee or the trust was created by will and the decedent's estate
is not yet closed.
80. For a discussion of the legal background behind principal place of
administration and the issues addressed in Section 108, see 5A SCOTT & FRATCHER,
supranote 30, §§ 611-615. For trust instruments without choice of law provisions, UTC
Section 107(2) provides that the meaning and effects of the terms of the trust will be
determined by the law of the jurisdiction having the most significant relationship to the
matter at issue. Among the factors to take into account in locating thejurisdiction having
the most significant relationship to a particular issue is the place of the trust's creation
and the place of current administration. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF

LAW §§ 270 cmt. c & 272 cmt. d (1971). Usually, the law of the trust's principal place
of administration will govern administrative matters, and the law of the place of the
trust's creation will govern interpretation of the trust's dispositive provisions.
81. For such an attempt, see CAL. PROB. CODE § 17002 (West 1991), which
provides that the principal place of administration is the usual place where the day-to-day
activity of the trust is carried on by the trustee or its representative primarily responsible
for its administration. If there is no such usual place, the principal place of
administration in the case of a trust with a single trustee is the trustee's residence or usual
place of business. In the case of a trust having more than one trustee, the principal place
of administration is the residence or usual place of business of any of the trustees as
agreed upon by them. In the absence of an agreement, the principal place of
administration is the residence or usual place of business of any of the cotrustees.
82. UTC § 108(a). In addition to selecting the trust's principal place of
administration, the settlor also may select the law to govern the trust. Under UTC
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/2
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subject, the UTC specifies a procedure for transferring the principal place of
administration, whether to another state or country.83 The transfer must facilitate
the trust's administration, and the trustee must inform the qualified beneficiaries
of the transfer at least sixty days in advance. The transfer may proceed as long
as no qualified beneficiary objects by the date specified in the notice.8" If a
qualified beneficiary objects, the trustee must obtain a court order. "Qualified
beneficiary," a defined term in the Code, excludes a beneficiary with a remote
remainder interest.85
Moving a trust to another state may offer the advantage of a lower income
tax rate, or it may become a necessity if the trustee orbeneficiaries have changed
their residence. But movement oftrusts are also triggered by merger offinancial
institutions. Such mergers are sometimes followed by the elimination of local
trust operations, and at least in the perception of some beneficiaries, by less
personal and attentive service. Given these mixed views on the benefits of
transferring a trust, the appropriate default rule for transferring a trust's principal
place of administration was a major topic of debate at the Commissioners' 2000
Annual Meeting at which the Code was approved. The draft, as presented to the
Commissioners, allowed the trustee to transfer the principal place of
administration upon giving sixty days' advance notice to the qualified
beneficiaries.86 Unlike the provision as finally approved, the draft did not grant
the beneficiaries a right to block the transfer. During the floor debate, the
suggestion was made that a transfer should be allowed only if all qualified

Section 107(1), the meaning and effect of the terms ofthe trust are to be determined by
the law of the jurisdiction designated in those terms. Such a governing law provision is
enforceable unless it is contrary to a strongpublicpolicy ofajurisdiction having the most
significant relationship to the matter at issue.
83. UTC § 108(b)-(f).
84. UTC § 108(d)(5). Ifthe transfer involves the appointment ofa new trustee, the
requirements for the appointment of a successor trustee, either under the trust instrument
or otherwise, also must be satisfied before the transfer can be accomplished. See UTC
§ 108(0.
85. UTC Section 103(12) defines a qualified beneficiary as follows:
"Qualified beneficiary," means a beneficiary who, on the date the beneficiary's
qualification is determined:
(A) is a distributee or permissible distributee of trust income or principal;
(B) would be a distributee or permissible distributee of trust income or principal if
the interests of the distributees described in subparagraph (A) terminated on that
date; or
(C) would be a distributee or permissible distributee of trust income or principal if
the trust terminated on that date.
For an analysis of this definition and the contexts in which it is used, see UTC § 103 cmt.
86. See UTC § 108(d) (Annual Meeting Draft 2000).
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beneficiaries consented or a court order had been obtained. 7 The provision as
finally approved, allowing a qualified beneficiary to block the transfer by filing
an objection with the trustee, was a compromise solution.
C. Representation and Settlements (Section 111 and Article 3)
The UTC strives to keep administration of trusts outside of the courts.
Numerous actions are allowed solely upon notice to the beneficiaries. These
actions include: transfer of a trust's principal place of administration to or from
another country or American state;8" combination of separate trusts into one, or
the division of a single trust into two or more separate trusts;8 9 resignation of a
trustee;9 submission of a trustee's report; 9' and a trustee's notice of proposed
plans of distribution. 2 Other actions can be accomplished upon consent of the
beneficiaries. These include selection of a successor trustee 93 and release of a
trustee from potential liability.94
But achieving notice to or the consent of all of the beneficiaries is
frequently difficult. Trusts commonly last for decades. In an increasing number
of American jurisdictions, trusts, in theory, can last in perpetuity. 9 The current
beneficiaries of the trust are frequently minors or adults who lack capacity.
Future beneficiaries may not yet be born. To achieve notice to or the consent of
beneficiaries incapable of representing themselves, others must be empowered
to act on their behalf. This is the function of rules on representation. Concepts
of representation are not new,96 but the UTC addresses the subject in more detail

87. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
PROCEEDINGS IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE ON UNIFORM TRUST CODE, 2000

ANNUAL MEETING 51-83 (on file with National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, 211 East Ontario Street, Chicago, Illinois 60611).
88. UTC § 108. For a discussion, see supranotes 77-87 and accompanying text.
89. UTC § 417. For a discussion, see infra note 159 and accompanying text.
90. UTC § 705. For a discussion, see infra note 210 and accompanying text.
91. UTC § 813. For a discussion, see infra notes 234-43 and accompanying text.
92. UTC § 817. Upon termination or partial termination ofa trust, Section 817(a)
provides that abeneficiary who is furnished with a proposed plan of distribution is bound
by the proposal unless the beneficiary objects to the trustee within thirty days.
93. UTC § 704. For a discussion, see infra note 209 and accompanying text.
94. UTC § 1009. For a discussion, see infra note 252 and accompanying text.
95. For a discussion ofthe motivations for creating so-called dynasty trusts, which
has led to the abolition of the rule against perpetuities in numerous American states, see
John G. Shively, The Death of the Life in Being-The Required FederalResponse to
State Abolition of the Rule Against Perpetuities,78 WASH. U. L.Q. 371 (2000).
96. Representation is addressed in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§
41-42 (1982), and in the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY §§ 180-186 (1936). Much
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/2
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than previous efforts and also makes representation available for actions taken
outside of court. The Code provides not only for representation by fiduciaries
(guardians, conservators, personal representatives, trustees of another trust, or
agents under a durable power of attorney),97 but also for what is known as virtual
representation, under which an otherwise unrepresented person (such as a child
who may not yet be born) may be represented and bound by another beneficiary
with a substantially identical interest with respect to the particular matter or
dispute.9 In addition, the Code authorizes the holder of a general testamentary
power of appointment to represent and bind permissible appointees, takers in
default, and others whose interests are subject to the power," and a parent to
represent and bind a minor orunborn child."° These last two categories deserve

of the language of Article 3 ofthe UTC can be traced to Section 1-403 ofthe UPC, which
was approved in 1969. However, the UPC provision applies only to representation in a
judicial proceeding.
97. UTC § 303. Representation by a guardian is allowed only if a conservator for
the ward has not been appointed. See UTC § 303(2). Representation by an agent is
permitted only if the agent has authority to act with respect to the particular matter or
dispute. See UTC § 303(3).
98. UTC § 304. In addition to unboms, under the Code, virtual representation may
be used to bind beneficiaries who are minors, incapacitated, or whose identity or location
is unknown and is not reasonably ascertainable.
The Code does not specifically require that the representation be adequate, the
drafters preferring to leave that issue to the courts. Under the Restatement ofProperty,
representation is deemed sufficiently protective as long as it does not appear that the
representative acted in hostility to the interest ofthe person represented. RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 185 (1936). Evidence of inactivity or lack of skill is material
onlyto the extent it establishes hostility. RESTATEMENT(FIRST) OFPROPERTY § 185 cmt.
b (1936).
Typically, the interests of the representative and the person represented will be
identical. A common example is atrust providing for distribution to the settlor's children
as a class, with an adult child being able to represent the interests of children who are
either minors or unborn. Under the Code, however, exact identity of interests is not
required, only substantial identity with respect to the particular matter or dispute.
Whether such identity is present may vary depending on the purpose of the
representation. For example, a presumptive remainderman may be able to represent
alternative remaindermen with respect to approval of a trustee's report but not with
regard to interpretation of the remainder provision or the termination of the trust. Even
if the beneficial interests of the representative and person represented are identical,
representation is not allowed in the event of conflict ofinterest. The representative may
have interests outside of the trust that are adverse to the interest of the person
represented, such as a prior relationship with the trustee or other beneficiaries. See
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 185 cmt. d (1936).
99. UTC § 302.
100. UTC § 303(6). Under this provision, a parent may act only if a guardian or
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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comment. Allowing a parent to represent and bind the parent's minor or unborn
child will be a novel concept for many states. However, the UPC has long
contained a similar provision that has not generated controversy, although the
UPC provision was limited to representation of living children.' 0 1 With respect
to representation by the holders of powers of appointment, a broader approach
rejected by the drafting committee would have provided for binding
representation whether or not the holder had a conflict of interest.0 2
The representation provisions of the UTC can be utilized not only for
purposes of achieving notice0 3 to or the consent"° of the beneficiaries0 5 for the
matters detailed above, but also to settle any dispute, whether in or out of court.
Section 111, the Code's nonjudicial settlement provision, is broad. The parties

conservator has not been appointed for the child.
101. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-403(2)(ii) (amended 1998).
102. To achieve eligibility for the federal estate tax marital deduction, a general
testamentary power of appointment is frequently coupled with a lifetime interest in the

trust's income. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(5) (2000). The drafters were concerned, without
the exception for conflict of interest, that the holder of a power could act in a way that
would enhance the holder's income interests to the detriment ofthe appointees or takers
in default. While the holder of a general testamentary power of appointment may appoint
the trust to anyone, including the holder's own estate, such holders are not entitled to a
benefit while living.
103. UTC Section 301(a) provides that notice to a person who may represent and
bind another person under Article 3 has the same effect as if it were given directly to the

person represented.
104. UTC Section 301(b) provides that the consent of a person who may represent
and bind another person under Article 3 is binding on the person represented. The
consent of the representative is not binding, however, if the person represented objects
to the representation before the consent otherwise would have become effective. The
representation principles of Article 3 sometimes will apply to adult and competent
beneficiaries, particularly if the beneficiary is being represented by a personal
representative or the trustee of another trust. Allowing such a beneficiary to effectively
register an objection implements cases such as Barberv. Barber,837 P.2d 714 (Alaska

1992), which held that the refusal to consider the beneficiary's objection to
representation violated due process.
105. Because Article 3 applies to representation of any person, the provisions of
the Article also apply to representation of an incapacitated settlor. However, pursuant
to Section 301(c), an agent, guardian, or conservator may act on behalf of an

incapacitated settlor in connection with the termination or revocation of the trust only if
the additional requirements of Sections 411 or 602 are satisfied. For a discussion of
Section 411, see infranotes 141-48 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Section
602, see infra notes 192-97 and accompanying text. Under these other Sections, a

conservator or guardian may represent a settlor only with the approval of the court
supervising the conservatorship or guardianship. An agent may represent the settlor only
if expressly so authorized in the power of attorney.
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may enter into a nonjudicial settlement agreement with respect to any matter
involving a trust."° The settlement agreement can contain any term or condition
that a court properly could approve. 1" 7 This standard is less stringent than one
requiring that the nonjudicial settlement contain terms and conditions that the
court would have approved, but it still opens the possibility that the parties may
achieve more nonjudicially than had they gone to court. On the other hand, in
Washington State, there is no limitation on the matters to which the parties to a
nonjudicial settlement can agree.'0 8 Among the issues under the Code that can
be resolved by a nonjudicial settlement agreement are the interpretation or
construction of the terms of the trust; approval of a trustee's report or
accounting; direction to a trustee to refrain from performing a particular act, or
to grant a trustee any necessary or desirable power; resignation or appointment
of a trustee; determination of a trustee's compensation; transfer of a trust's
principal place of administration to another jurisdiction; and liability of a trustee
for an action relating to the trust.0 9
Although the representation provisions provide legal practitioners with an
added tool that will solve many practical problems, they should not be used
without thought. Notice to and the consent of a representative is not binding if
there is a conflict of interest between the representative and those ostensibly
represented." 0 If conflict of interest is a possibility, the practitioner should
consider requesting the court to appoint a guardian ad litem (termed a
representative under the Code) to represent the otherwise unrepresented
beneficiary. Under the UTC, the appointment of a representative is available
whether the matter to be resolved is in or out of court. In making decisions, a
representative may consider general family benefit accruing to living members
of the individual's family.''

106. UTC § 111(b).
107. UTC §111(c).
108. For the Washington statute on nonjudicial settlements of estates and trusts
matters, see WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 11.96A.210 to 11.96A.250 (West Supp. 2002).
Forbackground on the Washington statute, see Bruce P. Flynn et al., NonjudicialDispute
ResolutionAgreements in TrustsandEstates-TheWashingtonExperienceandProposed
Act, 20 ACTEC NOTES 138 (1994).

109. UTC §111(d).
110. See UTC §§ 302-304.
111. UTC § 305. This Section authorizes the court to appoint a representative to
receive notice, give consent, and otherwise represent, bind, and act on behalf of
otherwise unrepresented persons or persons for whom the court concludes that the
available representation is inadequate. A representative may be appointed either to
represent a single individual or interest or several persons or interests.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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D. Rules of Construction(Section 112)
Rules of construction attribute intention to individual donors based on
assumptions of common intention. Rules of construction are found both in
enacted statutes and injudicial decisions. Rules of construction can involve the
meaning to be given to particular language in a document, such as the words
"heirs" or "issue." Rules of construction can address situations the donor failed
to anticipate, such as failure to anticipate the predecease of a beneficiary or to
specify the source from which expenses are to be paid. Rules of construction
also can make assumptions about how a donor would have revised donative
documents in light of events occurring after execution. These include rules
dealing with the effect of a divorce and the effect on a specific devisee if the
devised property is disposed of during the donor's lifetime." 2
While most states have enacted numerous statutes on the construction of
wills, most have not enacted rules of construction applicable to revocable trusts
and other nonprobate devices.
The UTC contains several provisions specifically addressed to revocable
trusts. 113 Not included in the Code, however, are rules of construction. While
the Code's drafters concluded that the rules of construction for revocable trusts
and, to a lesser extent, irrevocable trusts ought to be the same as the rules for
wills, the drafters realized that any effort on their part to draft detailed rules for
trusts would not succeed. Because the rules of construction of wills vary
radically among the states, any detailed rules on trusts that the drafters might
have developed would have matched the rules for wills in only a limited number
of states.
Instead of including detailed rules of construction for revocable trusts,
Section 112 of the UTC is a general provision providing that the enacting
jurisdiction's rules of construction for wills apply, as appropriate, to the
construction of trusts. But this Section of the UTC was placed in brackets with
the suggestion made in the comment that an enacting jurisdiction might be better
served by enacting specific rules of construction for trusts. The key is the
language in Section 112 stating that the rules on wills apply to trusts "as
appropriate." This phrase masks some very difficult questions. Not all will
constructionrules should necessarily be applied to trusts. Even those that should
apply may require modification due to the legal distinctions between wills and

112. See UTC § 112 cmt.
113. For a detailed discussion, see infra notes 186-203 and accompanying text.
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trusts. ' There is a need for a consensus on which rules should apply, and once
that has been determined, what they should say.
The most significant efforts to enact specific rules of construction for trusts
are the 1990 revision of Article II of the UPC and the 1994 California
legislation. In 1994, California extended to revocable trusts all of its rules on
construction of wills. California accomplished this feat by defining a
"testamentary gift" to include any transfer in possession or enjoyment taking
effect at or after death."' The result was that all existing rules on construction
of wills automatically applied to trusts." 6 But, because this simplistic approach
ignores the distinctions between wills and trusts, the California statute has been
only a partial success. The California Law Revision Commission is currently
drafting major revisions." 7
The 1990 revision of the UPC revision is more selective and also more
successful, extending only selected rules of will construction to trusts and, in
each case, by a newly drafted section. Topics covered include: a 120-hour
requirement of survival;"' the meaning of a specific reference requirement in a
power of appointment;" 9 construction ofclass gifts; 0 survivorship with respect
to future interests;"' abolition ofthe doctrine of worthier title;' and the meaning
of specific words, including "descendants,"'' "by representation,"' 24 and

114. Examples ofrules requiring modification include the rules ofconstruction on
abatement and the disposition of the share of a predeceased devisee, or so-called
antilapse statute. Abatement applies when the assets of the estate are insufficient to pay
all devises. Under a typical abatement statute, the residue abates first, followed by the
general devises, and lastly the specific devises. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-902
(amended 1998). While abatement logically should apply to a revocable trust used as a
substitute for a will, a trust does not contain "devises" or "residue." Special definitions
would be needed.
Applying the antilapse statute for wills to revocable trusts runs into property
classification issues. Devises under a will, because not effective until death, are
classified as present interests. On the other hand, because a revocable trust is created at
the moment it receives property, dispositions at the death of the settlor are classified as
future interests. Most existing antilapse statutes apply only to present interests.
115. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21104 (West Supp. 2001).
116. The rules are codified at CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 21101-21630 (West Supp.
2001).
117. Copies ofthe Commission's reports can be found at http://www.clrc.ca.gov.
118. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-702 (amended 1998).
119. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-704 (amended 1998).

120. UNIF.PROBATE CODE § 2-705 (amended 1998).
121.
122.
123.
124.

UNtF. PROBATE CODE
UNIF. PROBATE CODE
UNIF. PROBATE CODE
UNIF. PROBATE CODE

§ 2-707 (amended
§ 2-7 10 (amended
§ 2-708 (amended
§ 2-709 (amended

1998).
1998).
1998).
1998).
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"heirs."'" The 1990 UPC revisions have been enacted to date in nine states
and are recommended as a model.

26

E. Creation of Trusts (Sections 401-409)
Most of the Code's provisions on the requirements for creating an express
trust are straightforward and fairly conventional. The UTC divides trusts into
three categories-private, charitable, and honorary. Private trusts require an
ascertainable beneficiary; charitable trusts, by their very nature, are created for
the public at large. Honorary trusts include trusts for animals and other trusts for
a noncharitable purpose, such as maintenance of a cemetery lot.
Trusts may be created by transfer of property, self-declaration, or exercise
of a power of appointment. 27 Whatever method may have been employed, to

125. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-711 (amended 1998).
126. These states are Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana,
New Mexico, North Dakota, and South Dakota. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-2701
to 14-2711 (West 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-11-701 to 15-11-711 (2000); HAW.
REV. STAT. §§ 560:2-701 to 560:2-711 (Supp. 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 700.2701
to 700. 2720 (West Supp. 2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 524.2-701 to 524.2-711 (West
Supp. 2001); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-2-711 to 72-2-721 (2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§
45-2-701 to 45-2-711 (Michie 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 30.1-09.1-01 to 30.1-09.1-11
(1996 & Supp. 2001); S.D. CODIFIEDLAWS §§ 29A-2-701 to 29A-2-711 (Michie 1997).
127. UTC § 401. This Section is based on RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 10
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996), and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTRUSTS § 17 (1959). The
methods specified are not exclusive. Section 102 of the UTC recognizes that trusts also
can be created by special statute or court order. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 1cmt. a (Tentative DraftNo. 1, 1996); UNIF. PROBATECODE § 2-212 (amended
1998) (elective share of incapacitated surviving spouse to be held in trust on terms
specified in statute); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-41 l(a)(4) (amended 1998) (conservator
may create trust with court approval); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 17 cmt. i
(1959) (trusts created by statutory right to bring a wrongful death action). At common
law, a trust also can be created by a promise that creates enforceable rights in a person
who immediately or later holds these rights as trustee. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 10(e) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996). Because the Code is supplemented by the
common law, such trusts are valid even though they are not specifically recognized in the
Code.
Under the methods specified for creating a trust, a trust is not created until it
receives property. For what constitutes an adequate property interest, see RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 40-41 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999), RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS §§ 74-86 (1959), and UTC § 103(11). A trust also can be created without notice
to or acceptance by a trustee or beneficiary. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 14
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 35-36 (1959).
A trust created by self-declaration is best created by reregistering each of the assets
that comprise the trust into the settlor's name as trustee. Such reregistration, however,
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create a trust, the settlor must have the requisite capacity 28 and must indicate an
intention to create a trust, l29 the trustee must have duties to perform, 3 ' the trust
must have a definite beneficiary, 3 ' and the same person cannot be the sole

is not necessary to create the trust. See, e.g., In re Estate of Heggstad, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d
433 (Ct. App. 1993); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 10 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No.
1, 1996); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 17 cmt. a (1959). A declaration of trust
can be funded merely by attaching a schedule listing the assets that are to be subject to
the trust without executing separate instruments of transfer.
While Section 401 confirms the familiar principle that a trust may be created by
means of the exercise of a power of appointment (paragraph (3)), the Code does not
legislate comprehensively on the subject of powers of appointment but addresses only
selected issues. For the law on powers of appointment generally, see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 11.1-24.4 (1986).

128. UTC § 402(a)(1). To create arevocable or testamentary trust, the settlor must
have the capacity to make a will. To create an irrevocable trust, the settlor must have
capacity to transfer the property free oftrust. See UTC § 601 (capacity ofsettlor to create
revocable trust, discussed infra note 189 and accompanying text). See generally
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.1

(Tentative Draft No. 3, 2001); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 11 (Tentative Draft
No. 1, 1996); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 18-22 (1959).

129. UTC § 402(a)(2). For the intention requirement, see generallyRESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 13 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

TRUSTS § 23 (1959). But only such manifestations of intent as are admissible as proof
in ajudicial proceeding may be considered. See UTC § 103(17) & cmt. (definition of
"terms of a trust"). No particular manner of expression is necessary to manifest the
intention to create a trust. GEORGETAYLORBOGERT, THELAW OFTRUSTS AND TRUSTEES

§ 45 (rev. 2d ed. 1984). It is "immaterial whether or not the settlor knows that the
intended relationship is called a trust, and whether or not the settlor knows the precise
characteristics of the trust relationship." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 13
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996).
130. UTC § 402(a)(4); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (Tentative Draft
No. 1, 1996); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959). Trustee duties are usually
active, but a validating duty also may be passive, implying only that the trustee has an
obligation not to interfere with the trustee's enjoyment of the trust property. Such
passive trusts, while valid under this Code, may be terminable under the enacting
jurisdiction's Statute ofUses. See RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OFTRUSTS § 6 (TentativeDraft
No. 1, 1996); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 67-72 (1959).
131. UTC § 402(a)(3). A trust must have a definite beneficiary unless it is a
charitable trust, a trust for the care of an animal, or a trust for another valid noncharitable
purpose. The purpose of this requirement is to assure that there is someone capable of
enforcing the trust. There is no need to apply the requirement to charitable trusts. The
attorney general is capable of enforcing a charitable trust. With respect to a trust for an
animal or other valid noncharitablepurpose, the Code provides amethod ofenforcement.
See UTC §§ 408, 409 (discussed infra notes 138-39 and accompanying text).
While some beneficiaries will be definitely ascertained as of the trust's creation,
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beneficiary and sole trustee. 132 A trust not created by will is validly created if its
creation complied with the law of specified jurisdictions with which the settlor
or trustee had a significant contact. 3 3 A trust must have a purpose that is of

pursuant to Section 402(b), a beneficiary is definite as long as the beneficiary can be
ascertained within the applicable perpetuities period. The definite beneficiary
requirement does not prevent a settlor from making a disposition in favor of a class of
persons. Class designations are valid as long as the membership of the class will be
finally determined within the applicable perpetuities period. For background on the
definite beneficiary requirement, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 44-46
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 112-122 (1959).

Under traditional doctrine, a trust was not created if the trustee was required to
select from among an indefinite class. Such a provision was an imperative power that
failed because there was no beneficiary capable of enforcement. See, e.g., Clark v.
Campbell, 133 A. 166 (N.H. 1926). Such a power is valid under the Code, however.
Section 402(c) allows a settlor to empower the trustee to select the beneficiaries even if
the class from whom the selection may be made cannot be ascertained. The provision
is valid under both the Code and the Restatement if there is at least one person who can
meet the description. If the trustee does not exercise the power within a reasonable time,
the power fails and the property passes by resulting trust. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 46 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 122 (1959); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFPROPERTY: DONATIVETRANSFERS § 12.1 cmt.

e (1986).
132. UTC Section 402(a)(5), which codifies the doctrine of merger, prevents the
creation of a trust whenever the settlor is the sole trustee and sole beneficiary of all
beneficial interests. An example of a trust to which the doctrine of merger would apply
is a trust of which the settlor is sole trustee, sole beneficiary for life, and with the
remainder payable to the settlor's probate estate. On the doctrine of merger generally,
see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTRUSTS § 69 (Tentative DraftNo. 3,2001); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 341 (1959).

133. UTC § 403. For a detailed analysis ofthis Section, see Scoles, supranote 33.
The validity of a trust created by will is ordinarily determined by the law of the
decedent's domicile. No such certainty exists with respect to determining the law
governing the validity of inter vivos trusts. Generally, at common law a trust was created
if it complied with the law of the state having the most significant contacts to the trust.
Contacts for making this determination include the domicile ofthe trustee, the domicile
of the settlor at the time of trust creation, the location of the trust property, the place
where the trust instrument was executed, and the domicile of the beneficiary. See 5A
ScoTr & FRATCHER, supranote 30, §§ 597, 599. Furthermore, if the trust has contacts
with two or more states, one of which would validate the trust's creation and the other
of which would deny the trust's validity, the tendency is to select the law upholding the
validity of the trust. See 5A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supranote 30, § 600.
Section 403 extends the common law rule by recognizing a trust if its creation
complies with the law of any of a variety of states in which the settlor or trustee had
significant contacts. Pursuant to Section 403, a trust not created by will is validly created
if its creation complies with the law of the jurisdiction in which the trust instrument was
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/2
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benefit to its beneficiaries and that is not illegal or impossible to achieve," 4 and
the trust and its terms must be of benefit to the trust's beneficiaries. 35 The

executed, or the law of the jurisdiction in which, at the time of creation the settlor was
domiciled, had a place of abode, or was a national; the trustee was-domiciled or had a
place of business; or any trust property was located.
Section 403 is comparable to Section 2-506 of the UPC, which validates wills
executed in compliance with the law of a variety of places where the testator had a
significant contact. Unlike the UPC, however, Section 403 is not limited to execution
of the instrument but applies to the entire process of a trust's creation, including
compliance with the requirement that there be trust property. In addition, unlike the
UPC, Section 403 recognizes a trust if valid under the law of the domicile or place of
business of the designated trustee, or, ifvalid under the law of the place where any ofthe
trust property is located.
134. UTC § 404. Generally, a trust has a purpose that is illegal if: (1) its
performance involves the commission of a criminal or tortious act by the trustee; (2) the
settlor's purpose in creating the trust was to defraud creditors or others; or (3) the
consideration for the creation of the trust was illegal. UTC § 404 crnt. A trust with a
purpose that is unlawful or against public policy is invalid. Depending on when the
violation occurred, the trust may be invalid at its inception or it may become invalid at
a later date. The invalidity also may effect only particular provisions. Trust purposes
violative of public policy include those that tend to encourage criminal or tortious
conduct, interfere with freedom to marry or encourage divorce, limit religious freedom,
or are frivolous or capricious. For an explication of the requirement that a trust must not
have a purpose that is unlawful or against public policy, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS §§ 27-30 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§

59-65 (1959).
135. UTC § 404. Pursuant to Section 402(a), a trust must have an identifiable
beneficiary unless the trust is of a type that does not have beneficiaries in the usual sense,
such as a charitable trust or, as provided in Sections 408 and 409, trusts for the care of
an animal or other valid noncharitable purpose. The general purpose of trusts having
identifiable beneficiaries is to benefit those beneficiaries in accordance with their
interests as defined in the trust's terms. The requirement of Section 404 that a trust and
its terms be for the benefit of its beneficiaries, which is derived from RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 27(2) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999), implements this general
purpose. While a settlor has considerable latitude in specifying how a particular trust
purpose is to be pursued, the administrative and other nondispositive trust terms
reasonably must relate to this purpose and not divert the trust property to achieve a trust
purpose that is invalid, such as one that is frivolous or capricious. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 27 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999).
Section 412(b), which allows the court to modify administrative terms that are
impracticable, wasteful, or impair the trust's administration, is a specific application of
the requirement that a trust and its terms be for the benefit of the beneficiaries. The fact
that a settlor suggests or directs an unlawful or other inappropriate means for performing
a trust does not invalidate the trust if the trust has a substantial purpose that can be
achieved by other methods. SeeRESTATEMENT(THIRD)OFTRUSTS §28 cmt. e (Tentative
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creation of a trust may be contested on grounds of lack of capacity, undue
influence, or duress.136 There are no formal execution requirements for a written
trust. Furthermore, an oral trust is valid if its creation is evidenced by clear and
convincing evidence or unless its creation is forbidden by some other statute,
such as a Statute of Frauds.'37 Honorary trusts are recognized. A trust for the
care of an animal is valid for the life of the animal, and a trust for another
noncharitable purpose without an ascertainable beneficiary may be created but
is valid for only twenty-one years. 38 The drafters of the UTC specifically

Draft No. 2, 1999).
136. UTC § 406. This Section is similar to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY:
WELLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2001). Similar

to a will, a trust may be invalidated, in whole or in part, on grounds of undue influence,
duress, or fraud. A trust also may be contested on grounds that the settlor lacked
capacity. That a settlor have capacity is one of the essential elements for the creation of
a trust. See supriz note 128 and accompanying text.
Section 406 does not specify the factors for invalidating a trust on account of fraud,
duress, or undue influence. The rules for invalidating a trust for wrongful conduct are
not peculiar to the law of trusts but are also found under other law. The factors will vary
depending on whether the trust was created by will or inter vivos. For trusts created inter
vivos, the factors will vary depending on whether the trust was created pursuant to a
donative transfer or as part of a bargained for exchange. See generally RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 12 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996).
137. UTC § 407. The Statute of Frauds, as enacted in nearly all or all states,
requires that a trust of real property or transfer of real property to a trust be evidenced by
a writing. For a list of the statutes, see GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR
BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §§ 62-64 (rev. 2d ed. 1989). For cases

upholding a clear and convincing evidence standard for creating an oral trust, see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 20 reporter's notes (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996).
For the law of oral trusts generally, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 20 (Tentative
Draft No. 1, 1996); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 43-45 (1959).

138. UTC §§ 408 (trust for an animal), 409 (trust for another noncharitable
purpose). Honorary trusts are noncharitable trusts created for a proper trust purpose but
without an ascertainable beneficiary. Because there was no beneficiary capable of
enforcing the trust, such trusts failed at common law. The trustee had power to carry out
the terms of the trust but was free to ignore the settlor's wishes. Hence, the trust was no
more than an unenforceable power of appointment and was honorary only, binding only
on the trustee's conscience. For a discussion of the common law doctrine, see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 47 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 124 (1959); Adam J. Hirsch, Bequestsfor Purposes: A Unified
Theory, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 33 (1999).

Trusts for the care of an animal are usually created by will, but the Code does not
so restrict. Pursuant to Section 408(a), the trust also may be created during the settlor's

lifetime. A trust authorized by this Section may be created to benefit one designated
animal or several designated animals.
Noncharitable trusts ordinarily may be enforced by their beneficiaries. Charitable
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/2
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elected not to follow the offshore islands in their liberal authorization of the
noncharitable purpose ('NCP") trust. The NCP trust contemplated in the Code
is one created for a benevolent but noncharitable purpose, and, even then, it is
enforceable for only a limited duration.""

F. Trust Modification and Termination (Sections 410-417)
Due to the increasing use in recent years of long-term trusts, there is a need
for greater flexibility in the restrictive rules that apply concerning when a trust
may be terminated or modified other than as provided in the instrument. The
UTC provides for this increased flexibility but without disturbing the principle
that the primary objective of trust law is to carry out the settlor's intent."4 The
result is a liberalizing nudge, but one founded in traditional doctrine.
1. Modification or Termination by Beneficiaries
Section 411 follows traditional doctrine in allowing for termination or
modification of an irrevocable trust by unanimous agreement of the settlor and

trusts may be enforced by the state's attorney general or by a person deemed to have a
special interest. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTRUSTS § 391 (1959). But at common
law, a trust for the care of an animal or a trust without an ascertainable beneficiary
created for another noncharitable purpose was unenforceable because there was no
person authorized to enforce the trustee's obligations. Sections 408(b) and 409(2) close
this gap. The intended use of a trust authorized by either Section may be enforced by a
person designated in the terms of the trust or, if none, by a person appointed by the
court.
Because honorary trusts are often funded with far more property than needed to
carry out the intended purpose, disposition of excess funds is a frequent issue. If the
court determines that the trust property exceeds the amount needed for the intended
purpose and that the terms of the trust do not direct the disposition, a resulting trust is
ordinarily created in the settlor or settlor's successors in interest. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 47 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 124 (1959). Sections 408(c) and 409(3) codify this rule. Absent a provision
disposing of excess funds in the terms ofthe trust, property not required for the intended
use must be distributed to the settlor, if then living, otherwise to the settlor's successors
in interest. Successors in interest include the beneficiaries under the settlor's will, ifthe
settlor has a will, or in the absence of an effective will provision, the settloer's heirs.
139. For further explication on the limited recognition of purpose trusts in the
United States, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTRUSTS § 47 (Tentative DraftNo. 2,1999).
140. For further background on the American law on trust modification and
termination, together with a discussion ofthe relevant provisions ofthe UTC, see Ronald
Chester,Modification andTerminationof Trusts in the 21st Century: The Uniform Trust
Code Leads a Quiet Revolution, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. &TA. J. 697 (2001).
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beneficiaries.'
The UTC also follows traditional doctrine in allowing for
termination ofan irrevocable trust by unanimous agreement ofthe beneficiaries.
A trust may be terminated by the beneficiaries alone if it no longer serves a
material purpose, or it may be modified by the beneficiaries alone if such
modification is not inconsistent with a material purpose. 42 Provision is made
for partial termination or modification if obtaining the consent of all
beneficiaries is impracticable. 43 Similar to other sections of the UTC but not

141. UTC Section 41 l(a) is similar to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65(2)
(Tentative Draft No. 3,2001), and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 338(2) (1959),

both of which permit termination or modification upon unanimous agreement of the
beneficiaries and settlor. Unlike termination or modification by the beneficiaries alone
under Section 411 (b), termination or modification with the concurrence of the settlor
does not require a finding that the trust or the provision to be modified no longer serve
a material purpose. No finding of failure of material purpose is required because all
parties with a possible interest in the trust's continuation, both the settlor and
beneficiaries, agree there is no further need for the trust.
UTC Section 411(a) also addresses the authority of an agent, conservator, or
guardian to act on a settlor's behalf. Consistent with Section 602 on revocation or
modification of a revocable trust, discussed infranotes 192-97 and accompanying text,
Section 411 (a) provides that an agent may participate in a decision to modify or terminate
a trust only to the extent expressly authorized in the power of attorney or terms of the
trust. A guardian or conservator may consent to a proposed modification or termination
only upon approval of the court supervising the guardianship or conservatorship.
142. UTC Section 411 (b) carries forward the Claflinrule, first stated in the famous
case of Claflin v. Claflin, 20 N.E. 454 (Mass. 1889). Similar to RESTATEMENT (THIRD)

OFTRUSTS § 65(1) (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2001), the beneficiaries may terminate a trust
if the trust no longer carries out a material purpose and may modify the trust if the
modification is not inconsistent with a material purpose. Restatement Third,though, goes
further than the Code by also allowing the beneficiaries to use trust modification as a
basis for removing the trustee if removal would not be inconsistent with a material
purpose of the trust. Under the Code, while the unanimous request of the qualified
beneficiaries to remove the trustee is a factor for the court to consider, before removing
the trustee the court also must find that such action best serves the interests of all the
beneficiaries, that removal is not inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust, and
that a suitable cotrustee or successor trustee is available. Compare UTC § 706(b)(4),
with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2001). For
a discussion of the meaning of material purpose, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS

§ 65 cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2001).
Section 41 l(b) is more expansive than RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 337

(1959). Unlike the UTC and Restatement Third, the Restatement Second did not address
trust modification by the beneficiaries.
143. UTC Section 411 (e), which is similar to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS
§ 65 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2001), and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§

338(2), 340(2) (1959), allows for modification or termination of a trust by beneficiary
action even though the consent ofless than all of the beneficiaries has been obtained. To
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/2
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consistent with traditional doctrine, the representationprinciples ofArticle 3 may
be employed to obtain the necessary consents to termination. 1" Also, it is no
longer automatically presumed that a spendthrift provision is a material purpose
barring the beneficiaries from compelling termination of a trust. 45 The trustee's
consent is not required to modify or terminate a trust under Section 411.
Nevertheless, a trustee who concludes that the beneficiaries' action is not

qualify, the court first must find that the trust could have been terminated or modified
under Section 411(a) or (b) had all beneficiaries consented. Second, the court must be
assured that the interests of a nonconsenting beneficiary will be adequately protected.
This affords the court the opportunity to fashion an appropriate order protecting the
interests of the nonconsenting beneficiaries while at the same time permitting the
remainder of the trust property to be distributed without restriction. Typically, consent
of a beneficiary cannot be obtained because the beneficiary is a minor, incapacitated,
unascertained, or unbom, and representation under Article 3 is either unavailable or its
application uncertain. The order ofprotection forthe nonconsenting beneficiaries might
include partial continuation ofthe trust, the purchase of an annuity, or the valuation and
cashout of the interest.
144. For a discussion of the provisions ofArticle 3 on representation by others, see
supra notes 96-111 and accompanying text. A consent given by a representative is
invalid to the extent there is a conflict of interest between the representative and the
person represented with respect to the particular matter or dispute. Given this limitation,
virtual representation of a beneficiary's interest by another beneficiary pursuant to
Section 304 rarely will be available in a trust termination case, although it should be
routinely available in cases involving trust modification, such as a grant to the trustee of
additional powers. If virtual or other form of representation is unavailable, Section 305
of the Code permits the court to appoint a representative who may give the necessary
consent to the proposed modification or termination on behalf of the minor,
incapacitated, unbom, or unascertained beneficiary. The ability to use virtual and other
forms of representation to consent on a beneficiary's behalf to a trust termination or
modification traditionally has not been part ofthe law, although there are some notable
exceptions. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 337(1) (1959) (beneficiary
must not be under incapacity), with Hatch v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 361 F.2d 559 (D.C. Cir.
1966) (guardian ad litem authorized to consent on the beneficiary's behalf).
145. UTC § 41 1(c). Spendthriftterms sometimeshavebeen construedto constitute
a material purpose without inquiry into the intention of the particular settlor. For
examples, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 337 (1959); GEORGE GLEASON
BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 1008 (rev.
2d ed. 1983), and 4 AUSTIN WAKEMAN ScoTr & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE
LAW OF TRUSTS § 337 (4th ed. 1989). This result is troublesome because spendthrift
provisions are often added to instruments with little thought. Section 411(c), similar to
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2001), does not
negate the possibility that continuation of a trust to assure spendthrift protection might
have been a material purpose of the particular settlor. The question whether that was the
intent of a particular settlor is instead a matter of fact to be determined based on the
totality of the circumstances.
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justified has standing to object to a proposed termination or modification.1"
Furthermore, while the beneficiaries can terminate an irrevocable trust without
the concurrence of the settlor, the settlor also has standing to challenge the

proposed action. 4 7 Upon termination of a trust by the beneficiaries, whether
with or without the settlor's consent, the trust property is to be distributed as the
beneficiaries agree."
2. Modification or Termination Because of
Unanticipated Circumstances
Section 412 of the UTC confirms, but at the same time expands, the
traditional doctrine of equitable deviation. The court may apply the doctrine to
modify not only administrative terms but also dispositive provisions. Before
ordering a modification or termination, the court must find that there are
circumstances not anticipated by the settlor and that modification or termination
will further the purposes of the trust. To the extent practicable, the modification
must be made in accordance with the settlor's probable intention. 49 Without

146. LrTC § 410(b).
147. UTC § 410(b). This is contrary to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391
(1959), which does not mention, and presumably precludes, a settlor from bringing an
action. Section 410(b) also grants a settlor standing to petition the court under Section
413 to apply cypres to modify the settlor's charitable trust. For a discussion, see infra
note 167 and accompanying text.
148. UTC § 411(d).
149. UTC § 412(a). Subsection (a) is similar to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS
§ 66(1) (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2001), except that this Section, unlike the Restatement,
does not impose a duty on the trustee to petition the court if the trustee is aware of
circumstances justifyingjudicial modification. The purpose ofthe "equitable deviation"
authorized by Subsection (a) is not to disregard the settlor's intent but to modify
inopportune details to better effectuate the settlor's broader purposes. Among other
things, equitable deviation maybe used to modify administrative or dispositive terms due
to the failure to anticipate economic change or the incapacity of a beneficiary. Or
modification of the dispositive provisions to increase support of a beneficiary might be
appropriate if the beneficiary has become unable to provide for support due to poor
health or serious injury. For numerous illustrations, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 66 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2001). While there must be circumstances
not anticipated by the settlor before the court may grant relief under Subsection (a), the
circumstances may have been in existence when the trust was created. This Section thus
complements Section 415, discussed infra notes 155-56 and accompanying text, which
authorizes a court to reform a trust based on mistake of fact or law at the creation of the
trust.
While a trustee normally must obtain approval of a court before deviating from the
terms of the trust, emergencies may arise necessitating that the trustee take immediate
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/2
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regard to unanticipated circumstances, the court also may modify an
administrative term if continuation of the trust on its existing terms would be
impracticable, wasteful, or impair the trust's administration.15 Upon termination
of a trust, the trustee must distribute the property in a manner consistent with the
purposes of the trust.'51

3. Uneconomical Trust
Section 414 of the UTC authorizes the court to terminate an uneconomical
trust of any size and allows a trustee, without approval of court, to terminate a
trust with a value of $50,000 or less. 52 Before terminating the trust, the court or

action. Section 412 does not require that the trustee obtain prior approval before
deviating from the terms of the trust. Pursuant to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §
167(2) (1959), without first obtaining permission of the court, a trustee properly can
deviate from a trust in the event of an emergency or if the trustee reasonably believes
there is an emergency.
150. UTC § 412(b). Subsection (b) broadens the court's ability to modify the
administrative terms of a trust. Unlike Section 412(a), modification may be ordered
whether or not there are circumstances anticipated by the settlor. The standard under
Subsection (b) is similar to the standard for applying cy pres to a charitable trust. See
UTC § 413(a) (discussed infranotes 163-65 and accompanying text). Just as a charitable
trust may be modified if its particular charitable purpose becomes impracticable or
wasteful, so can the administrative terms of any trust, charitable or noncharitable.
Subsection (b) is also an application of the requirement of Section 404 that a trust and
its terms must be for the benefit of its beneficiaries. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 27(2) & cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999). Although the settlor is granted
considerable latitude in defining the purposes of the trust, the principle that a trust have
apurpose that is for the benefit ofits beneficiaries precludes unreasonable restrictions on
the use of trust property. An owner's freedom to be capricious about the use of the
owner's own property ends when the property is impressed with a trust for the benefit of
others. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTRUSTS § 124 cmt. g (1959). Thus, attempts to
impose unreasonable restrictions on the use oftrustproperty will fail. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 27 reporter's notes to cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999).
Subsection (b), unlike Subsection (a), does not have a direct precedent in the common
law, but various states have insisted on such a measure by statute. See, e.g., Mo. REV.
STAT. § 456.590.1 (2000).
151. UTC § 412(c). As under the doctrine of cypres, effectuating a distribution
consistent with the purposes of the trust requires an examination of what the settlor
would have intended had the settlor been aware of the unanticipated circumstances.
Typically, such terminating distributions will be made to the qualified beneficiaries, often
in proportion to the actuarial value of their interests, although the Section does not so
prescribe. For the definition of qualified beneficiary, see UTC § 103(12), discussed
supra note 85 and accompanying text.
152. UTC § 414(a). The drafters concluded that a trust with a value of $50,000 or
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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trustee must conclude that the value of the trust property is insufficient to justify
the cost of administration.'
Upon termination of the trust, the trustee is to
distribute the trust property in a manner consistent with the purposes of the
trust.' 54 The figure $50,000 was placed in brackets to signal that states are free
to change the amount. Initial indications are that many states will increase the
amount to $100,000.
4. Reformation

Consistent with the Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other
Donative Transfers,5 Section 415 of the UTC clarifies that the doctrine of
reformation may be applied to testamentary, as well as inter vivos, trusts. Also,
the doctrine may be applied to correct a mistake of fact or law even if the
original terms of the trust, as originally but mistakenly created, are unambiguous.
The mistake may be one either of expression or inducement, but, in any event,
it must be established by clear and convincing evidence.'56

less is sufficiently likely to be inefficient to administer that a trustee should be able to
terminate it without the expense of ajudicial termination proceeding. Settlors are free
to set a higher or lower figure, to specify different procedures, or to prohibit termination
without a court order. See UTC § 105 (discussed supranotes 70-76 and accompanying
text).
153. UTC § 414(b). The court may terminate a trust under this Section even if the
settlor has forbidden it. See UTC § 105(b)(4). Judicial termination under this Section
may be used whether or not the trust is larger or smaller than $50,000.
When considering whether to terminate a trust under either Section 414(a) or (b),
the trustee or court should consider the purposes of the trust. Termination is not always
wise. Even if administrative costs may seem excessive in relation to the size of the trust,
protection of the assets from beneficiary mismanagement may indicate that the trust be
continued. The court may be able to reduce the costs of administering the trust by
appointing a new trustee.
154. In addition to outright distribution to the beneficiaries, Section 816(21)
authorizes payment to be made by a variety of alternate payees. Distribution under
Section 414 typically will be made to the qualified beneficiaries in proportion to the
actuarial value of their interests. To assure that the qualified beneficiaries are consulted
on the plan, Section 414(a) requires that the qualified beneficiaries be notified in advance
ofa trustee's proposed modification or termination of an uneconomic trust. With respect
to modifications or terminations by the court, the qualified and other beneficiaries would
usually receive notice as interested parties under local civil procedure rules.
155.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY:

WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE

TRANSFERS § 12.1 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1995).
156. UTC § 415. Reformation of inter vivos instruments to correct a mistake of
law or fact is a long-established remedy. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS
AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1995), which this

Section copies, clarifies that this doctrine also applies to wills.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/2
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5. Modification to Achieve Settlor's Tax Objectives
In another provision derived from the Restatement (Third) of Property:
Wills and Other Donative Transfers,'57 Section 416 expands the court's ability

to modify a trust to achieve the settlor's tax objectives. The court may modify
the trust in any manner not contrary to the settlor'sprobable intention. The court
also may give the modification retroactive effect.'
Such broad authority is

Reformation is available under the Code whether the mistake is one of expression
or one of inducement. A mistake of expression occurs when the terms of the trust
misstate the settlor's intention, fail to include a term that was intended to be included, or
include a term that was not intended to be excluded. A mistake in the inducement occurs
when the terms of the trust accurately reflect what the settlor intended to be included or
excluded but this intention was based on a mistake of fact or law. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 cmt. i
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 1995). Mistakes of expression are frequently caused by
scriveners' errors while mistakes of inducement often trace to errors of the settlor.
Reformation is different from resolving an ambiguity. Resolving an ambiguity
involves the interpretation of language already in the instrument. Reformation, on the
other hand, may involve the addition of language not originally in the instrument or the
deletion of language originally included by mistake, if necessary to conform the
instrument to the settlor's intent.
Because reformation may involve the addition of language to the instrument or the
deletion of language that may appear clear on its face, reliance on extrinsic evidence is
essential. To guard against the possibility of unreliable or contrived evidence in such
circumstance, the higher standard of clear and convincing proof is required. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1
cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1995).
In determining the settlor's original intent, the court may consider evidence relevant
to the settlor's intention even though it contradicts an apparent plain meaning of the text.
The objective of the plain meaning rule, to protect against fraudulent testimony, is
satisfied by the requirement in Section 415 of clear and convincing proof. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHERDONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1
cnt. d & reporter's notes (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1995); see also John H. Langbein &
Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reformation of Wills on the Ground ofMistake: Change of
Directionin American Law?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 521 (1982).
157.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATVE
TRANSFERS § 12.2 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1995).
158.
UTC § 416. "Modification" under this Section is broader than the

"reformation" authorized by Section 415. Reformation under Section 415 is available
when the terms of a trust fail to reflect the donor's original, particularized intention. The
mistaken terms are then reformed to conform to this specific intent. The modification
authorized by Section 416 need not conform to the settlor's original intent. Frequently,
this original intent cannot be ascertained because the need for modification is due to a
change in tax law, an event the settlor could not have anticipated. Modification under
Section 416, therefore, is similar in concept to the cypres doctrine for charitable trusts,
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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appropriate because the settlor's objective-to achieve tax savings ofaparticular
type-is usually abundantly clear. The other sections of Article 4, where
applicable, also can be used to secure modifications for tax reasons.
6. Combination and Division of Trusts
Consistent with many state statutes, Section 417 authorizes a trustee to
divide a trust or combine trusts without approval of court. While the trust or
trusts that result need not have identical provisions, the consolidation or division
cannot impair the rights of any beneficiary or adversely affect achievement of
the trust purposes. Before combining trusts or dividing a trust, the trustee must
send notice of the proposed action to the qualified beneficiaries. Prior notice to
the qualified beneficiaries of a proposed combination or division is required.'59

discussed infra notes 163-66 and accompanying text, and the deviation doctrine for
unanticipated circumstances, discussed supranotes 149-51 and accompanying text.
Whether a modification made by the court will be recognized under federal tax law
is a matter of federal law. Absent specific statutory or regulatory authority, binding
recognition is normally given only to modifications made prior to the taxing event, for
example, the death ofthe testator or settlor in the case of the federal estate tax. See Rev.
Rul. 73-142, 1973-1 C.B. 405. Among the specific modifications authorized by the
Internal Revenue Code or Service are the revision ofsplit-interest trusts to qualify for the
charitable deduction, modification of a trust for a noncitizen spouse to become eligible
as a qualified domestic trust, and the splitting of a trust to utilize better the exemption
from generation-skipping tax more effectively.
The donor's tax objectives are to be established by apreponderance ofthe evidence.
Such evidence can be gathered from the "express terms of the donative document, by
inference from the donative document orby extrinsic evidence." RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.2 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1995).
Modification of the document to achieve the settlor's tax purposes can be undertaken at
any time, even if there has been no change in the tax law. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.2 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1995). If the
modification involves the alteration of the beneficial interests of the trust, it must be done
in such a manner so as not to violate the donor's probable intention. The greater the
alteration of the beneficial interest, the "more rigorous the court should be in measuring
the requested modification against the donor's probable intention." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.2 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 1,
1995). If the court approves the modification, it can take effect "whenever necessary to
achieve the purpose for which the modification is ordered." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.2 crnt. e (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1995).
159. UTC § 417. This Section is subject to contrary provision in the terms of the
trust. See UTC § 105; supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text. Many trust
instruments and standardized estate planning forms include comprehensive provisions
governing combination and division of trusts. Except for the requirement that the
qualified beneficiaries receive advance notice of a proposed combination or division,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/2
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G. CharitableTrusts (Sections 405 and 413)
Charitable gifts maybe made innumerous ways. The donor may create and
transfer property to a non-profit corporation. The donor may make an outright
gift to charity in the donor's will. The donor may transfer property directly to
a charity but subject its use to various restrictions. Finally, the donor may create
a charitable trust.
Charitable trusts must have a charitable purpose, a concept that was firmly
established by the Statute of Charitable Uses of 1601"6 and that has evolved

Section 417 is similar to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 68 (Tentative Draft No. 3,
2001).
Numerous states have enacted statutes authorizing division of trusts, either by
trustee action or upon court order. For a list ofthese statutes, see RESTATEMENT (THID)
OF PROPERTY: DONATIVETRANSFERS § 12.2 statutory note (Tentative Draft No. 1,1995).
Combination or division also has been authorized by the courts in the absence of an
authorizing statute. See, e.g., BankBoston v. Marlow, 701 N.E.2d 304 (Mass. 1998)
(division); In re Heller Inter Vivos Trust, 613 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sur. Ct. 1994) (division);
In re Will of Marcus, 552 N.Y.S.2d 546 (Sur. Ct. 1990) (combination).
Section 417 allows a trustee to combine two or more trusts even though their terms
are dissimilar. Typically, the trusts to be combined will have been created by different
members of the same family and will vary on only insignificant details, such as the
presence of different perpetuities savings periods. The more the dispositive provisions
of the trusts to be combined differ from each other, the more likely it is that a
combination would impair some beneficiary's interest, hence the less likely that the
combination can be approved. Combining trusts may prompt more efficient trust
administration and is sometimes an alternative to terminating an uneconomic trust as
authorized by Section 414. See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
Division oftrusts is often beneficial and, in certain circumstances, almost routine.
Division of trusts is frequently undertaken due to a desire to obtain maximum advantage
of exemptions available under the federal generation-skipping tax. While the terms of
the trusts that result from such a division are identical, the division will permit differing
investment objectives to be pursued and allow for discretionary distributions to be made
from one trust and not the other. Given the substantial tax benefits often involved, a
failure by the trustee to pursue a division might, in certain cases, be a breach of fiduciary
duty.
Section 417 authorizes a trustee to divide a trust even if the trusts that result are
dissimilar. Conflicts among beneficiaries, including differing investment objectives,
often invite such a division, although, as in the case with a proposed combination of
trusts, the more the terms of the divided trusts diverge from the original plan, the less
likely it is that the settlor's purposes would be achieved and that the division could be
approved. Even ifthe terms ofthe divided trusts are identical, identity ofthe assets is not
required. For the authority of the trustee to make non-pro-rata distributions in
distributing the assets of the divided trust, see UTC § 816(22).
160. Statute of Charitable Uses, 1601, 43 Eliz., c. 4 (Eng.).
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over the centuries as society has changed. Doctrine also has evolved regarding
what is to be done upon failure of a charitable purpose as provided in a trust's
terms. The court will apply what is known as cypres to reform the gift to better
carry out the settlor's broader charitable purposes. If the settlor's charitable
purpose is deemed specific rather than general, however, under traditional
doctrine, the charitable trust has failed, and the property must be returned to the
settlor or settlor's successors in interest.
Copying a provision from the RestatementofTrusts, the UTC provides that
a charitable trust may be created for the relief of poverty, the advancement of
education or religion, the promotion of health, governmental or municipal
purposes, or other purposes, the achievement of which is beneficial to the
community. 6 ' A charitable trust does not fail because the settlor has
insufficiently specified a charitable purpose. Applying a doctrine akin to cy
pres, the court may save the trust by selecting a charitable purpose or
beneficiaries. 62

161. UTC § 405(a); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 (Tentative Draft
No. 3, 2001); RESTATEMENT (SECOND}OF TRUSTS § 368 (1959). The directive to the
courts to validate purposes the achievement ofwhich are beneficial to the community has
proved to be remarkably adaptable over the centuries. The drafters concluded that it
should not be disturbed. Charitable trusts are subject to the restriction in Section 404,
discussed supranotes 134-35 and accompanying text, that a trust purpose must be legal
and not contrary to public policy. This would include trusts that involve invidious
discrimination. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No.
3, 2001). For a modem perspective on the charitable purposes doctrine, see Mary Kay
Lundwall, Inconsistency and Uncertainty in the CharitablePurposes Doctrine, 41
WAYNE L. REV. 1341 (1995).
162. UTC § 405(b) (similar to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 397 cmt. d
(1959)). In addition to specifying particular charitable purposes or recipients if the
charitable purpose expressed in the trust is insufficiently definite, the court may delegate
to the trustee the framing of an appropriate scheme. To the extent the settlor's charitable
intent can be ascertained, the particular scheme selected must be consistent with that
intent. Section 405(b) is a corollary to Section 413(a), discussed infra notes 163-65 and
accompanying text, which codifies the doctrine ofcypres.: Under the doctrine ofcypres,
a trust failing to state a general charitable purpose does not fail upon failure of the
particular means specified in the terms ofthe trust. The court instead must apply the trust
property in a manner consistent with the settlor's charitable purposes to the extent they
can be ascertained.
Section 405(b) does not supercede the long-established estate planning technique
of delegating to the trustee the selection of the charitable purposes or recipients. In that
case, judicial intervention to supply particular terms is not necessary to validate the
creation of the trust. The necessary terms instead will be supplied by the trustee. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 396 (1959). Judicial intervention under Section
405(b) is necessary only if the trustee fails to make a selection. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 397 cmt. d (1959).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/2
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Perhaps more significantly, the UTC liberalizes the doctrine of cypres"63
in a way believed more likely to carry out the average settlor's intent. First, the
Code expands the ability of the court to apply cypres. To enable the court to
more efficiently structure the gift to carry out the settlor's charitable purposes,
the Code provides that the court may apply cy pres not only if the original
scheme becomes impossible or unlawful, but also if it becomes impracticable or
wasteful."' Second, the Code creates a presumption in favor of general
charitable intent. In applying cypres, the court cannot divert the trust property
to a noncharity unless the terms of the trust expressly so provide. The court
instead must modify the trust's terms or apply or distribute the trust property in
a manner consistent with the settlor's charitable purposes.1 65
The UTC also changes the doctrine of cy pres to eliminate a severe
administrative inefficiency. The Code recognizes that provisions diverting
property to a noncharity that take effect far in the future often cause more
mischief than help, necessitating detailed searches for heirs and the running of
property through numerous estates. To limit this difficulty, under the Code, a
gift over to a noncharity upon failure or impracticality of the original charitable
purpose is effective only if, when the provision is to take effect, the trust
property is to revert to the settlor or, whether or not the trust property is to revert
to the settlor, fewer than twenty-one years have elapsed since the date of the

163.
Cypres may be applied to modify either an administrative or dispositive
term, or the court may order the trust terminated and distributed to other charitable
entities. Partial termination also may be ordered if the trust property is more than
sufficient to satisfy the trust's current purposes.
164. UTC § 413(a) (similar to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (Tentative
Draft No. 3, 2001)). Cases of waste normally involve situations where the funds
allocated to the particular charitable scheme far exceed what is needed.
165. UTC § 413(a). Traditional doctrine did not supply such a presumption,
leaving it to the courts to determine whether the settlor had a general charitable intent.
If such an intent was found, the trust property was applied to other charitable purposes.
If not, the charitable trust failed. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1959).
In the great majority of cases, the settlor would prefer that the property be used for other
charitable purposes. In addition, courts are usually able to find a general charitable
purpose to which to apply the property, no matter how vaguely such purpose may have
been expressed by the settlor. For criticism of the traditional doctrine, of which the
drafters of the UTC took cognizance, see Ronald Chester, Cy Pres: A Promise
Unfulfilled, 54 IND. L.J. 407 (1979); Alex M. Johnson, Jr.,LimitingDeadHandControl
of CharitableTrusts: Expandingthe Use of the Cy Pres Doctrine,21 U. HAW. L. REV.
353 (1999); Frances Howell Rudko, The Cy Pres Doctrine in the UnitedStates: From
Extreme Reluctance to Affirmative Action, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 471 (1998); Roger G.
Sisson, Comment, Relaxing the Dead Hand's Grip: CharitableEfficiency and the
Doctrine of Cy Pres,74 VA. L. REV. 635 (1988).
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Some may conclude that this period is too short. One option

for lengthening the period would be to provide that a reversion back to the settlor
or settlor's estate is valid if the failure of charitable purpose occurs at any time
during the lives of the settlor or settlor's descendants alive at the creation of the
trust. Whichever period is chosen, the objective is to promote administrative
convenience, with the shorter period in the UTC being the more efficient.
Traditionally, standing to enforce a charitable trust is conferred on the
state's attorney general and on persons with a special interest. Concluding that
the settlor often has the greatest, if not the only, practical interest in seeing that

the trust is enforced, the Code also grants a settlor standing to enforce or to seek
modification of a charitable trust.' 67

H. SpendthriftProvisionsand Rights ofBeneficiary's Creditors
(Article 5)
Spendthrift provisions,, when effective, prohibit a beneficiary from
assigning the beneficiary's interest and preclude an attachment of the interest by
the beneficiary's creditor or assignee. Spendthrift provisions are not recognized
in England, where trust law originated, and they are of limited utility in the
United States. A spendthrift provision provides only limited protection to the

beneficiary. The creditor or assignee may pounce upon the trust funds as soon
as distribution is made. But even funds retained in trust are not always
protected.

Numerous exceptions to spendthrift protection are recognized,

depending on the type of creditor, the category of beneficiary, or the time when
the claim was made.
The article containing the provisions of the UTC relating to spendthrift

provisions and the rights of a beneficiary's creditors was the most widely
debated article of the Code. The result, however, largely tracks standard

166. UTC § 413(b). Subsection (b) does not apply to a charitable lead trust, under
which a charity receives payments for a term certain with a remainder to a noncharity.
In the case of a charitable lead trust, the settlor's particular charitable purpose does not
fail upon completion of the specified trust term and distribution of the remainder to the
noncharity. Upon completion ofthe specifiedtrust term, the settlor's particular charitable
purpose instead has been fulfilled. For a discussion of the reasons for a provision such
as Section 413(b), see Ronald Chester, CyPresof Gift Over: The Searchfor Coherence
in JudicialReform of FailedCharitableTrusts, 23 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 41 (1989).
167. UTC § 405(c) (enforcement); UTC § 410(b) (modification). For the right
ofthe state attorney general, a cotrustee, or persons with special interests to enforce either
the trust or their interests, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 (1959). Persons
with a special interest are typically charitable organizations specifically designated to
receive a benefit in the terms of the trust, although a class, if of sufficiently small size,
also may qualify. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 cmt. c (1959).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/2
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American doctrine. A trust is not spendthrift unless the instrument specifically
so states; the drafters rejected the approach that all trusts are spendthrift unless
the instrument says otherwise. 16 8 In addition, a restraint against claims by the
creditors of a beneficiary is effective only if the beneficiary is also restrained
from assigning the beneficiary's interest. 6 9 The drafting committee concluded
that it was undesirable as a matter of policy for a beneficiary to be able to
transfer the beneficiary's interest while at the same time denying the
beneficiary's creditors the right to reach the trust in payment of their claims.
Even with the Code's requirement that a spendthrift provision, to be valid, must
restrain both voluntary and involuntary transfer, the settlor, in effect, can give a
beneficiary power to assign the interest by granting the beneficiary a power of
appointment.
The drafting committee also concluded that it was undesirable as a matter
of policy to allow a settlor to create a trust, retain a beneficial interest, but yet

168. This rule is consistent with the approach in the great majority of states.
However, a few state statutes prohibit assignment by a beneficiary, thereby making the
trust automatically spendthrift. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-1.5(a)
(McKinney 1992); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 58 cmt. b & reporter's
note (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999). Given that spendthrift provisions are routinely
inserted in trust instruments, it can be argued that applying a spendthrift presumption to
instruments that have neglected to include a provision would better carry out settlor
intent. But the routine insertion argument also supports the opposite conclusion-that
the drafter's omission of a spendthrift provision was not inadvertent but deliberate.
169. UTC § 502(a). The requirement that a spendthrift provision, to be valid, must
restrain both voluntary and involuntary transfer, is consistent with the Restatement. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 58 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 152(2) (1959).
Under the Code, a spendthrift provision is effective regardless of whether it
restrains an interest in income, principal, or both. A spendthrift provision valid under the
Code also will be recognized as valid in a federal bankruptcy proceeding. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 541(c)(2) (2000). A disclaimer, because it is a refusal to accept ownership of an
interest and not a transfer of an interest already owned, is not affected by the presence or
absence of a spendthrift provision. Most disclaimer statutes expressly provide that the
validity of a disclaimer is not affected by a spendthrift protection. See, e.g., UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-801(a) (amended 1998). Releases and exercises of powers of
appointment are also not affected because they are not transfers of property. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 58 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999).
A valid spendthriftprovision makes itimpossible for abeneficiaryto make alegally
binding transfer, but the trustee may choose to honor the beneficiary's purported
assignment. The trustee may recommence distributions to the beneficiary at any time.
The beneficiary, not having made a binding transfer, can withdraw the beneficiary's
direction but only as to future payments. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 58
cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 152 cmt. i
(1959).
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deny the settlor's creditors the right to reach the trust. Consequently, the UTC
rejects the approach taken in the legislation enacted in Alaska, Delaware, and,
more recently, Rhode Island and Nevada, which allows a settlor to retain a
beneficial interest immune from claims of the settlor's creditors. 7 ' Under the
Code, a creditor of the settlor fully can reach the settlor's beneficial interest.'7 '
A key policy issue in drafting the UTC was determining which classes of
creditors should be exempt from the spendthrift restraint. In determining the
exceptions, the drafting committee did not start from scratch but paid particular
attention to the exceptions listed in Restatement (Third)of Trusts Section 59.172
The Restatement of Trusts, and the trust statutes in many states, as well as other
relevant statutes, such as the Federal Bankruptcy Code and the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act, 74 grant special deference to collection of court
orders for support of a beneficiary's child, spouse, or former spouse. Given this
background and the important public policy concerns in iaking certain that
those to whom legal obligations of support are owed actually receive such
payment, the Code concluded that the settlor's possible contrary intent should
be subordinate to the right of a child, spouse, or former spouse to attach the
beneficiary's interest in the trust to collect on a court order for support.'

170. For a discussion of the Alaska, Delaware, Nevada, and Rhode Island statutes,
see Karen E. Boxx, Gray's Ghost-A ConversationAbout the Onshore Trust, 85 IOWA
L. REv. 1195 (2000).
171. UTC § 505(a)(2). The power of the creditors to reach the settlor's beneficial
interest applies irrespective of whether the trust contains a spendthrift provision. If the
trustee has discretion to distribute the entire income and principal to the settlor, the effect
is the same as ifno trust had been created; the settlor's creditors can reach the entire trust.
Section 505(a)(2) is consistent with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 58(2) & cmt. e
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999), and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156 (1959).
172. Exceptions recognized under RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 59
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999) are claims for the support of a child, spouse, or former
spouse; services or supplies provided for necessities or for the protection of the
beneficiary's interest; and claims ofa governmental unit to the extent recognized by state
statute or federal law.
173. Under the Federal Bankruptcy Code, an individual debtor is not discharged
from any debt to a spouse, former spouse, or child for alimony, maintenance, or support.
See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (2000).
174. To qualify under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"),
a pension plan must provide that a participant's benefits may be used to satisfy a
qualified domestic relations order. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3) (2000).
175. UTC Section 503(b) authorizes a claimant for unpaid support to attach present
or future distributions that otherwise would be made to the beneficiary. Distributions
subject to attachment include distributions required by the express terms ofthe trust, such
as mandatory payments of income, and distributions the trustee otherwise has decided
to make, such as through the exercise of discretion. Protection of the claims of
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/2
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The UTC also creates an exception for claims by governmental units to the
extent a state statute or federal law so provides, 76 thereby leaving to other state
law the extent to which a state can pierce a trust to collect for the costs of
institutionalized care. Unlike the Restatement, the UTC does not create an
exception for the providers of a beneficiary's necessary support.' n Most such
claims involve claims of the state for the costs of institutionalized care, which the
Code's drafters concluded was betterhandledby the exception for governmental
claims. The UTC, however, allows a judgment creditor who has provided

dependents and former spouses is supported by a number of state statutes and is widely,
although not universally, supported by case authorities. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 59 reporter's note to clause (a) & crnt. b (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999); 2A
AUSTINWAKEMANSCOTr&WILLIAMFRANKLINFRATCHER,THELAWOFTRUSTS § 157.1

(4th ed. 1987).
Section 503(a) provides that a "child" includes any person for whom an order of
child support has been entered. This definition acconmodates the differing approaches
states take to defining the class of individuals eligible for child support, including such
issues as whether support can be awarded to stepchildren. However the state making the
award chooses to define "child," the definition will be recognized under the Code,
whether the order sought to be enforced was entered in the same or different state.
176. UTC § 503(c) (similar to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 59 cmt. a
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999)). Federal pre-emption guarantees that certain federal
claims, such as claims by the Internal Revenue Service, may bypass a spendthrift
provision no matter what this Code might say. The case law and relevant Internal
Revenue Code provisions on the exception for federal tax claims are collected in GEORGE
GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §

224 (rev. 2d ed. 1992), and 2A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supranote 175, § 157.4. Regarding
claims by state governments, Section 503(c) recognizes that states take a variety of
approaches with respect to collection, depending on whether the claim is for unpaid
taxes, for care provided at an institution, or for other charges. Acknowledging this
diversity, Section 503(c) does not prescribe a rule, but refers to other statutes of the state
on whether particular claims are subject to or exempted from spendthrift provisions.
177. Unlike RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 59(b) (Tentative Draft No. 2,
1999), and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTRUSTS § 157(b) (1959), the UTC does not create
an exception to the spendthrift restriction for creditors who have furnished necessary
services or supplies to the beneficiary. Most of these cases involve claims by
governmental entities, which the drafters concluded are better handled by the enactment
ofspecial legislation as authorized by Subsection (c). The drafters also declined to create
an exception for tort claimants. For a discussion of the exception for tort claims, which
has not generally been recognized, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTRUSTS § 59 reporter's
notes to cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999). For a discussion of other exceptions to a
spendthrift restriction, recognized in some states, see BOGERT &BOGERT, supranote 176,
§ 224, and 2A SCOTT &FRATCHER, supranote 175, §§ 157-157.5.
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services for the protection of the beneficiary's interest to reach that interest in
78
repayment.
Exemption from a spendthrift bar does not necessarily mean that a
beneficiary's creditor will collect. If the trust is discretionary or for support, the
creditor usually cannot attach the beneficiary's interest. The UTC abolishes the
often evasive distinction between discretionary and support trusts. The
beneficiary's creditor cannot collect whether the discretion is expressed in the
form of a standard of distribution or not, even if the discretion was abused. 179
The only exception pertains to claims for child support or alimony, which are
recognized because of the important societal interests involved. To the extent
a trustee has failed to comply with a standard of distribution or has abused a
discretion, the court may direct that the shortfall be paid to satisfy ajudgment or
court order for support or alimony. The court must direct the trustee to pay the
child, spouse, or former spouse such amount as is equitable under the
circumstances but not in excess of the amount the trustee was otherwise required
to distribute to or for the benefit of the beneficiary.'80

178. UTC § 503(b). This exception is in accord with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999), and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 157(c) (1959). Without this exception, a beneficiary of modest means might be
prevented from obtaining services essential to the protection or enforcement of the
beneficiary's rights under the trust. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 59 cmt. d
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999).
179. UTC § 504(b). Under Subsection (b)and the Restatement (Third)of Trusts,
a so-called "support" trust is viewed as a discretionary trust with a support standard even
if the trust purportedly directs the trustee to provide for the beneficiary's support. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 60 reporter's notes to cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2,
1999).
Subsection (b) will have limited application. Pursuant to Section 502, the effect of
a valid spendthrift provision, where applicable, is to prohibit a creditor from collecting
on a distribution prior to its receipt by the beneficiary. Only if the trust is not protected
by a spendthrift provision or the creditor falls within one of the exceptions to spendthrift
enforcement created by Section 503 is Section 504 relevant.
Section 504(b), which establishes the general rule, forbids a creditor from
compelling a distribution from the trust, even if the trustee has failed to comply with the
standard of distribution or has abused a discretion. Under Section 504(d), the power to
force a distribution due to an abuse of discretion or failure to comply with a standard
belongs solely to the beneficiary. The inability of a beneficiary's creditor to force a
distribution from a discretionary interest applies even if the creditor may attach other
interests of the beneficiary, such as a required distribution of income.
180. UTC § 504(c). Before fixing this amount, the court having jurisdiction over
the trust might wish to consider that, in setting the respective support award, the family
court already has considered the respective needs and assets of the family. The Code
does not prescribe a particular procedural method for enforcing a judgment or order
against the trust, leaving that matter to local collection law.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/2
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The UTC addresses several miscellaneous creditor issues. To protect a trust
from an immediate attachment as soon as a payment becomes due, whether the
payment is periodic or upon termination of the trust, the UTC provides that
spendthrift protection is lost only after the trustee has had a reasonable time in
which to make the distribution."" The UTC clarifies that a revocable trust is
fully subject to the settlor's creditors while the settlor is living."s In addition,
following the settlor's death, a revocable trust is liable for the settlor's debts to
the extent the settlor's probate estate is insufficient. " 3 Although the UTC treats
the holder of a power ofwithdrawal the same as the settlor of a revocable trust,"

Section 504(a), which is identical to Section 503(a), provides that a"child" includes
any person for whom an order of child support has been entered. See supra note 175
(discussing the definition of "child").
181. UTC § 506. Whether a trust contains a spendthrift provision or not, a trustee
should not be able to avoid creditor claims against a beneficiary by refusing to make a
distribution required to be made by the express terms ofthe trust. On the other hand, a
spendthrift provision would become largely a nullity were a beneficiary's creditors able
to attach all required payments as soon as they became due. Section 506 reflects a
compromise between these two competing principles. A creditor can reach a mandatory
distribution, including a distribution upon termination, if the trustee has failed to make
the payment within a reasonable time after the required distribution date. Following this
reasonable period, payments mandated by the express terms of the trust are, in effect,
being held by the trustee as agent for the beneficiary and should be treated as part of the
beneficiary's personal assets. Section 506 is similarto RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTRUSTS

§ 58 cnt. d (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999).
182. UTC § 505(a)(1). The ability of a settlor's creditors to reach a revocable
trust prior to the settlor's death is now a well-accepted conclusion. See RESTATEMENT
(THiRD) OF TRUSTS § 25 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996). Such claims were not
allowed at common law, however. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 330 cmt.
o(1959). Because a settlor usually also retains a beneficial interest that a creditor may
reach under Section 505(a)(2), the common law rule, were it to be retained in this Code,
would be of little significance.
183. UTC § 505(a)(3). For a discussion of this provision, see infranote 203 and
accompanying text.
184. UTC § 505(b)(1). This provision treats a power of withdrawal as the
equivalent of a power of revocation because the two powers are functionally identical.
This is also the approach taken in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 56 cmt. b
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999). fthe power is unlimited, the property subject to the
power will be fully subject to the claims of the power holder's creditors, the same as the
power holder's other assets. If the power holder retains the power until death, the
property subject to the power may be liable for claims and statutory allowances to the
extent the power holder's probate estate is insufficient to satisfy those claims and
allowances. For powers limited either in time or amount, such as a right to withdraw an
annual exclusion contribution within thirty days, the creditors would be limited to the
withdrawal amount and would be required to take action prior to the expiration of the
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an exception is created for Crummey and five and five powers. Upon the release
or lapse of a power of withdrawal, assets falling within the annual exclusion or
five and five limit are exempt from claims of the holder's creditors." 5

. Revocable Trusts (Article 6)
The revocable trust is the most common trust created in the United States
and is used largely as a substitute for a will. In a desire to avoid the probate
process, the settlor will place all of his or her assets into the trust. These assets
then will be disposed of at the settlor's death as provided in the trust instrument.
Typically, the trust will be self-declared, with a successor trustee stepping in
only at the settlor's death or incapacity.
Because the extensive use of revocable trusts is a recent phenomenon,
beginning decades, if not centuries, after most traditional trust law was
formulated, there are numerous issues involving such trusts that have yet to be
adequately addressed in the case law or state statutes. The provisions of the
UTC on revocable trusts not only fill in many of these gaps but are also among
the Code's most important and innovative provisions. The biggest change is a
reversal of the common law presumption that trusts are irrevocable. Reflecting
the increasing, if not predominant, use of the revocable trust in the United States,

thirty-day period.
The Code does not address creditor issues with respect to property subject to a
special power of appointment or a testamentary general power of appointment. For
creditor rights against such interests, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY:
DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 13.1-13.7 (1986). The Code also does not address possible
rights against a settlor who was insolvent at the time of the trust's creation or was
rendered insolvent by the transfer of property to the trust. This subject is instead left to
the state's law on fraudulent transfers. A transfer to the trust by an insolvent settlor also
might constitute a voidable preference under federal bankruptcy law.
185. UTC § 505(b)(2). Upon the lapse, release, or waiver of a power of
withdrawal, the property formerly subject to the power normally will be subject to the
claims ofthe powerholder's creditors and assignees the same as ifthe power holderwere
the settlor of a now irrevocable trust. Pursuant to Section 505(a)(2), a creditor or
assignee of the power holder generally may reach the power holder's entire beneficial
interest in the trust, whether or not distribution is subject to the trustee's discretion.
However, following the lead of Arizona and Texas, Section 505(b)(2) creates an
exception for trust property that was subject to a Crummey or five and five power. See
ARiZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-7705(G) (West Supp. 2001); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §
112.035(e) (Vernon Supp. 2002). Upon the lapse, release, or waiver of a power of
withdrawal, the holder is treated as the settlor of the trust only to the extent the value of
the property subject to the power at the time ofthe lapse, release, or waiver exceeded the
greater of the amounts specified in IRC §§ 2041(b)(2) or 2514(e) (2000) (the greater of
five percent or $5,000), or IRC § 2503(b) (2000) ($11,000 in 2002).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/2
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the Code follows the lead of California, Iowa, Montana, Oklahoma, and Texas
in providing that a trust is revocable absent clarifying language in the terms of
the trust.' Professional drafters routinely state whether a trust is revocable or
irrevocable. Providing a presumption in the statute is, therefore, most relevant
to self-drafted trusts or trusts prepared by less competent counsel. These trusts,
when silent, are more often than not intended to be revocable. Because the
Code's presumption ofrevocability will reverse the rule in mostjurisdictions, the
presumption applies only to trust instruments executed on or after the date of
enactment.' Should an intent to make the trust irrevocable be omitted from the
instrument, the court may reform the trust to conform it to the settlor's
intention.'
The UTC treats the revocable trust, in most respects, as the functional
equivalent of a will, at least while the settlor is alive. Following the trend in the
case law, the capacity requirement for creating a trust is the same as that for a
will. The capacity standard for wills also applies to revocation, amendment,
adding property to the trust, or otherwise directing the actions of the trustee.'89

186. UTC § 602(a). The most recent revision of the Restatement of Trusts
similarly reverses the former approach. A trust is presumed revocable if the settlor has
retained a beneficial interest. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 63 cmt. c
(Tentative Draft No. 3, 2001). For the state statutes, see CAL. PROB. CODE § 15400
(West 1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.3102 (Supp. 2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-33401 (2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 175.41 (West 1994); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §

112.051(a) (Vernon 1995).
187. UTC § 602(a).
188. See UTC §415 (discussed supranotes 155-56 and accompanying text); see
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 62, 63 cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2001).
189. UTC § 601 (patterned after RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 11(1)
(Tentative DraftNo. 1, 1996) and consistent with recent case law); see Argo v. Moncus,
721 So. 2d 218,219 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998); Upman v. Clarke, 753 A.2d 4 (Md. 2000);
Martone v. Martone, 509 S.E.2d 302 (Va. 1999). Because the revocable trust is used
primarily as a will substitute, applying the capacity standard for wills is appropriate.
Also, the revocable trust is normally used in conjunction with a pourover will. The use
of a pourover will assures that property not transferred to the trust during life will, at
death, be combined and distributed with the property the settlor managed to convey.
Applying the capacity standard for wills assures that one standard, the standard for wills,
will govern in such coordinated revocable trust/pourover will plans.
The Code does not explicitly spell out the standard of capacity necessary to create
other types of trusts, although Section 402, discussed supra notes 128-32 and
accompanying text, does require that the settlor have capacity. Section 601 includes a
capacity standard for creation of a revocable trust because of the uncertainty in the case
law and the importance of the issue in modem estate planning. No such uncertainty
exists with respect to the capacity standard for other types of trusts. To create a
testamentary trust, the settlor must have the capacity to make a will. To create an
irrevocable trust, the settlor must have the capacity that would be needed to transfer the
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In addition, while the settlor has capacity, the settlor has the same control over
the trust that a testator has over a will and the testator's own property. Notices
that otherwise would be given to the beneficiaries instead must be given to the
settlor, and all other rights that the beneficiaries might have are within the
settlor's exclusive control. The settlor is authorized to give binding consents on
a beneficiary's behalf, and access to the trust document is also within the
settlor's control. Just as the devisees under the will of a living testator do not
have a right to be informed of their prospective devise, then neither do the
beneficiaries of a revocable trust. Under the Code, however, the settlor's
authority over the beneficiaries terminates upon the settlor's loss of capacity."°
Thereafter, unless provided otherwise in the terms of the trust, the beneficiaries
may assert their rights as beneficiaries.'
The rights of the beneficiaries upon the settlor's incapacity was extensively
debated by the drafting committee. One view was that a revocable trust should,
in all instances, be treated the same as a will. Because the devisees under a will
have no right to know of the devise no matter how incapacitated the settlor, then
neither should the beneficiaries of a revocable trust. Another approach
emphasized the use of a trust as a lifetime management device. Those holding
this view argued that, in order for the beneficiaries to protect their rights,
disclosure of the trust upon the settlor's incapacity should be required even if
such disclosure was prohibited in the terms of the trust. The provision as finally
drafted was a compromise. Settlors for whom confidentiality is important can
so provide in the terms of the trust. Otherwise, upon the settlor's incapacity, the
beneficiaries are entitled to learn of the trust.

property free of trust. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND
OTHERDONATIVETRANSFERS § 8.1 (Tentative DraftNo. 3, 2001); RESTATEMENT(THIRD)

OF TRUSTS § 11 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996).

190. UTC § 603(a).
191. The beneficiaries are entitled to request information concerning the trust, and
the trustee must provide the beneficiaries with annual trustee reports and whatever other
information may be required under Section 813. See infra notes 234-43 and
accompanying text. Because Section 603 may be freely overridden in the terms of the
trust, a settlor is free to deny the beneficiaries these rights, even to the point of directing
the trustee not to inform them of the existence of the revocable trust. See UTC § 105
(discussed supranotes 69-76, infra notes 244-45, and accompanying text). Also, should
an incapacitated settlor later regain capacity, the beneficiaries' rights again will be
subject to the settlor's control. The cessation of the settlor's control upon the settlor's
incapacity or death does not mean that the beneficiaries may reopen transactions the
settlor approved while having capacity. The trustee, however, may be required to
account to the beneficiaries for transactions taken during such period. See Evangelho v.
Presoto, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146 (Ct. App. 1998) (interpreting Sections 15800 and 16064
of the California Probate Code, upon which Section 603(a) of the UTC was based).
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Revocation of a trust differs fundamentally from revocation of a will.
Revocation of a will, because a will is not effective until death, does not affect
an existing fiduciary relationship. With a trust, however, because a revocation
will terminate an existing fiduciary relationship, there is a need to protect a
trustee who might act without knowledge that the trust has been revoked. There
is also a need to protect trustees against the risk that they will misperceive the
settlor's intent and mistakenly assume that an informal document or
communication constitutes a revocation when that was not, in fact, the settlor's
intent. To protect trustees against these risks, drafters habitually insert
provisions providing that a revocable trust may be revoked only by delivery to
the trustee of a formal revoking document. Some courts require strict
compliance with the stated formalities. Other courts, recognizing that the
formalities were inserted primarily for the trustee's, and not the settlor's, benefit
will accept other methods ofrevocation as long as the settlor's intent is clear.1"
This Code tries to effectuate the settlor's intent to the maximum extent
possible while at the same time protecting a trustee against inadvertent liability.
While notice to the trustee of a revocation is good practice, the Code does not
make the giving of such notice a prerequisite to a trust's revocation.
Furthermore, the Code generally honors a settlor's clear expression of intent
even if inconsistent with stated formalities in the terms of the trust. To protect
the trustee, however, a trustee is immunized for actions taken without knowledge
of the revocation or amendment. 93
Unless the terms of the trust make a specified method of revocation
exclusive, the UTC provides that a trust may be revoked by substantial
compliance with the method specified inthe trust's terms orby any other method

192. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 63 reporter's notes to cmts. h-j
(Tentative Draft No. 3, 2001).
193. UTC § 602(g) (providing that a trustee who does not know that a trust has
been revoked or amended is not liable to the settlor or settlor's successors in interest for
distributions made and other actions taken on the assumption that the trust had not been
amended or revoked).
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manifesting clear and convincing evidence of the settlor's intent, 94 including by
a later will or codicil. 95
The Code also addresses the extent to which a guardian, conservator, or
agent under a durable power of attorney may exercise the power to revoke or
amend on behalf of an incapacitated settlor. Because most revocable trusts are
created with the intent that management of the settlor's assets will be handled by
the trustee and not by a subsequently-appointed guardian or conservator, a
guardian or conservator should not succeed automatically to the settlor's power
to revoke the trust. Requiring that the guardian or conservator first obtain court
permission is appropriate, and the Code so requires. 96 Similarly, when a settlor

194. UTC § 602(c). Even ifthe method is made exclusive, a failure to comply with
a technical requirement, such as required notarization, may be excused as long as
compliance with the method specified in the terms of the trust is otherwise substantial.
While revocation of a trust ordinarily will continue to be accomplished by signing
and delivering a written document to the trustee, other methods, such as a physical act
or an oral statement coupled with a withdrawal of the property, also might demonstrate
the necessary intent. These less formal methods, because they provide less reliable
indicia of intent, often will be insufficient, however. The method specified in the terms
of the trust is a reliable safe harbor and should be followed whenever possible.
195. UTC § 602(c)(2) (providing that a trust may be revoked or amended by a
later will or codicil that expressly refers to the trust or that specifically devises property
that otherwise would pass under the trust). The drafters mentioned revocation or
amendment by will not to encourage the practice, but to make clear that it is not
precluded by omission. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER
DONATIVETRMISFERS § 7.2 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2001) (validating revocation

or amendment of will substitutes by later will). Situations do arise, particularly in deathbed cases, where revocation by will may be the only practicable method. In such cases,
a will, a solemn document executed with a high level of formality, may be the most
reliablemethod for expressing intent. A revocation in a will ordinarily becomes effective
only upon probate of the will following the testator's death. For the cases, see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OF TRUSTS § 63 reporter's notes on cmts. h-i (Tentative Draft No.

3, 2001).
A residuary clause in a will disposing of the estate differently than the trust is alone
insufficient to revoke or amend a trust. The provision in the will either must be express
or the will must dispose of specific assets contrary to the terms of the trust. The
substantial body of law on revocation of Totten trusts by will offers helpful guidance.
The authority is collected in William H. Danne, Jr., Annotation, Revocation ofTentative
("Totten') Trust of Savings Bank Account by Inter Vivos Declaration or Will, 46
A.L.R.3d 487 (1972).
196. UTC § 602(f). Under the UTC, a "conservator" is appointed by the court to
manage the ward's party, a "guardian" to make decisions with respect to the ward's
personal affairs. UTC § 103.
Many state conservatorship statutes authorize a conservator to exercise the settlor's
power of revocation only upon approval of the court supervising the conservatorship.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/2
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creates both a revocable trust and a durable power of attorney, the power of
attorney is usually intended to supplement and not supercede the trust.
Implementing this presumption, the UTC allows the settlor's agent to revoke or
amend the trust only to the extent expressly authorized either in the trust or
power of attorney.197
Will contests are typically barred under one of two alternative statutes.
Normally, a contest is barred following some period of time following notice of
probate, ranging from two to six months. In addition, many states bar a contest
after a specified period of time following the settlor's death, whether or not the
will was probated or notice of probate given. The most commonly enacted time
limit is three years following the testator's death. 19 Most states currently have
no limitation period on contest of a revocable trust. Section 604 corrects this
omission. The Section is designed to allow an adequate time in which to bring
a contest while at the same time permitting the expeditious distribution of the
trust property following the settlor's death. A potential contestant must file a

See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 411(a) (amended 1998). UTC Section 602(f) ratifies
this practice. Because a settlor often creates a revocable trust for the very purpose of
avoiding conservatorship, the authority of the court to approve a conservator's request
to revoke should be exercised reluctantly.

Settlors concerned about revocation by a

conservator may wish to deny a conservator a power to revoke. While such a provision
in the terms of the trust is entitled to considerable weight, the court may override the

restriction ifit concludes that the action is necessary in the interests ofjustice. See UTC
§ 105(b)(13).
Steps a conservator can take to stem possible abuse are not limited to petitioning
to revoke the trust. The conservator could petition for removal of the trustee under
Section 706. See infranotes 223-33 and accompanying text. The conservator, acting on
the settlor-beneficiary's behalf, also could bring an action to enforce the trust according
to its terms. Pursuant to Section 303, a conservator may act on behalf ofthe beneficiary
whose estate the conservator controls whenever a consent or other action by the
beneficiary is required or may be given under the Code. See UTC § 303; see also supra
note 97 and accompanying text.
If a conservator has not been appointed, Section 602(f) authorizes a guardian to
exercise a settlor's power to revoke or amend the trust upon approval of the court
supervising the guardianship. The court supervising the guardianship will need to
determine whether local law allows it to grant a guardian authority to revoke a revocable
trust or whether it will be necessary to appoint a conservator for that purpose.
197. UTC § 602(e) (similar to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 63 cmt. 1
(Tentative Draft No. 3, 2001)). An express provision is required because most settlors
usually intend that the revocable trust, and not the power of attorney, function as the
settlor's principal property management device. The power of attorney is usually
intended as a backup for assets not transferred to the revocable trust or to address specific
topics, such as the power to sign tax returns or apply for government benefits, which may

be beyond the authority of a trustee or are not customarily granted to a trustee.
198. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-108 (amended 1998).
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contest within the earlier of 120 days following receipt of an optional notice or
three years following the settlor's death."9 For those not receiving notice, three
years should be ample time in which to determine whether they have an interest
that will be affected by the trust. These time limits have been placed in brackets,
however, with the suggestion made in the comments that states should substitute
the periods under their comparable will contest statutes.200 In addition, to
encourage expeditious distribution of trust assets, a trustee who has not been
notified that a contest has or will be filed is absolved from liability for making
distributions before the contest period has expired.20' Liability in such cases is
solely on the distributees.20 2

199. UTC § 604(a). The drafters rejected the approach taken in California, which
mandatesnotice. Cf CAL.PROB. CODE § 16061.7 (West 1991 & Supp. 2002). To trigger
the 120-day period, the trustee must send the potential contestant a copy of the trust
instrument, and the notice must inform the potential contestant of the trust's existence,
of the trustee's name and address, and of the time allowed for commencing a contest.
Section 604 applies only to actions to contest a trust. A "contest" is an action to
invalidate all or part of the terms of the trust or of property transfers to the trustee.
Grounds for contest include lack of intent to create a trust or lack of capacity, see UTC
§ 402 (discussed supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text), that undue influence,
duress, or fraud was involved in the trust's creation, see UTC § 406 (discussed supra
note 136 and accompanying text), or that the trust had been revoked or modified, see
UTC § 602 (discussed supra notes 193-97 and accompanying text). An action against
a beneficiary or other person for intentional interference with an inheritance or gift, is not
considered a contest, and therefore, is not subject to this Section. For the law on
intentional interference, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774B (1979). Nor does
Section 604 preclude an action to determine the validity of a trust that is brought during
the settlor's lifetime, such as a petition for a declaratory judgment, if such action is
authorized by other law. See UTC § 106 (UTC supplemented by common law of trusts
and principles of equity) (discussed supranotes 25-26 and accompanying text).
200. UTC § 604 cmt.
201. UTC § 604(b). Because only a small minority of trusts are actually contested,
trustees should not be restrained from making distributions because of concern about
possible liability should a contest later be filed. Absent a protective statute, a trustee is
ordinarily absolutely liable for misdelivery of the trust assets, even if the trustee
reasonably believed that the distribution was proper. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

TRUSTS § 226 (1959). Section 604(b) addresses liability concerns by allowing the
trustee, upon the settlor's death, to proceed expeditiously to distribute the trust property.
The trustee may distribute the trust property in accordance with the terms of the trust
until and unless the trustee receives notice of a pending judicial proceeding contesting
the validity of the trust, or until notified by a potential contestant of a possible contest,
followed by its filing within sixty days.
202. UTC § 604(c) (making the beneficiaries of what later turns out to have been
an invalid trust liable to return any distribution received). Issues as to whether the
distribution must be returned with interest, or with income earned or profit made are not
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/2
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Because a revocable trust is usually employed as a -will substitute, it is
appropriate to subject trust assets at the settlor's death to the claims of the
settlor's creditors and other estate-related expenses. The UTC clarifies that the
assets of a revocable trust are liable for such charges to the extent the probate
estate is insufficient. °a The Code, however, does not try to resolve the many
other issues that can arise, such as liability among different categories of
nonprobate assets, whether claims against nonprobate assets should be subject
to a special statute oflimitations, and whether this period canbe shortened by the
giving of notice. The appropriate answers to these questions will depend on the
particulars of the state's probate code. Section 6-102 of the UPC, added to that
Code in 1998, may be looked to as a model both by states that have enacted the
UPC and by those having different probate systems.
J. Cotrustees (Section 703)
While most of the procedural issues involved in administering a trust can
be addressed in the trust instrument, it is difficult to anticipate all questions.
Even if the drafter does anticipate every issue, the drafter frequently will rely on
the local trust statute for guidance on the language to employ. Oftentimes, the
drafter will choose to let the statute control. The UTC specifies numerous
procedural rules for administering a trust. All of these procedures are subject to
override in the terms ofthe trust," 4 but the drafters ofthe UTC expect that many
scriveners of trust instruments may prefer to rely on the Code. Among the
procedural issues addressed in the UTC are the methods for transferring a trust's
205
principal place ofadministration to or from another country or American state;
the method for revoking or amending a revocable trust; 206 the requirements for
rejecting or accepting appointment as trustee; 20 7 the division of responsibilities

addressed in the Code but are left to the law of restitution.
203. UTC § 505(a)(3). Death-related expenses for which the revocable trust is
potentially subject include creditor claims, costs of administration, the expenses of the
settlor's funeral and disposal ofremains, and statutory allowances to a surviving spouse
and children.
204. UTC § 105 (discussed supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text).
205. UTC § 108 (discussed supra notes 77-87 and accompanying text).
206. UTC § 602 (discussed supranotes 193-97 and accompanying text).
207. UTC § 701. Under the Code, a person designated as trustee accepts the
trusteeship by substantially complying with the method of acceptance provided in the
terms of the trust, or ifthe terms of the trust do not make the specified method exclusive,
by accepting delivery of the trust property, exercising powers or performing duties as
trustee, or otherwise indicating acceptance ofthe trustee. UTC § 701(a). The procedure
by which a trustee may accept office closely tracks the procedure for revoking a trust.
Compare UTC § 701(a), with UTC § 602(c) (discussed supra notes 194-95 and
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among cotrustees; 2 8 the procedure for appointing a successor trustee; 20 9 and the
requirements for an effective trustee resignation.1 0

accompanying text).
To avoid the inaction that can result if the person designated as trustee fails to
communicate a decision either to accept or to reject the trusteeship, Section 701(b)
provides that a failure to accept within a reasonable time after learning ofthe designation
constitutes a rejection of the trusteeship. A trustee's rejection normally precludes a later
acceptance but does not cause the trust to fail. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §
35 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999). Section 701(c)(1) allows a nominated trustee
to act expeditiously to preserve the trust property without being considered to have
accepted the trusteeship. However, within a reasonable time after acting, the nominated
trustee must send a rejection of office to the settlor, if living and competent, or otherwise
to a qualified beneficiary. Because ofthe potential liability that can inhere in trusteeship,
Section 701(c)(2) allows a person designated as trustee, without accepting the
trusteeship, to inspect or investigate trust property for any purpose. The condition ofreal
property is a particular concern, including possible tort liability for the condition of the
premises or liability for violation of state or federal environmental laws such as the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
208. UTC § 703 (discussed infranotes 218-22 and accompanying text).
209. UTC § 704(c)-(d). The Code creates separate procedures for the filling of
a vacancy required to be filled depending on whether the trust is charitable or
noncharitable. Section 704(c) specifies the procedure for filling a vacancy in the
trusteeship of a noncharitable trust. Absent an effective provision in the terms of the
trust, Subsection (c)(2) permits a vacancy in the trusteeship to be filled, without the need
for court approval, by a person selected by unanimous agreement of the qualified
beneficiaries. If the qualified beneficiaries fail to make an appointment, Section
704(c)(3) authorizes the court to fill the vacancy. In making the appointment, the court
should consider the objectives and probable intention ofthe settlor, the promotion ofthe
proper administration ofthe trust, and the interests and wishes of the beneficiaries. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 34 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 108 cmt. d (1959).
Section 704(d) specifies the procedure for filling a vacancy in the trusteeship of a
charitable trust. Absent an effective designation in the terms of the trust, a successor
trustee may be selected by the charitable organizations expressly designated to receive
distributions in the terms of the trust but only if the attorney general concurs in the
selection. If the attorney general does not concur in the selection or if the trust does not
designate a charitable organization to receive distributions, the vacancy may be filled
only by the court.
210. UTC § 705(a). This Section rejects the common law rule that a trustee may
resign only with permission of the court and goes further than the Restatements, which
allow a trustee to resign with the consent ofthe beneficiaries. See RESTATEMENT(THIRD)
OFTRUSTS § 36 (Tentative DraftNo. 2, 1999); RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTRUSTS § 106
(1959). Rather, Section 705(a) approximates standard drafting practice by providing that
a trustee may resign by giving notice to the qualified beneficiaries, a living settlor, and
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All of the above items were the subject of extensive discussion during the
drafting of the UTC. The resulting rules are an effort to further several notalways-consistent objectives. The UTC generally prefers the honoring of intent
over required formalities. Consequently, absent specific provision in the terms
of the trust, a trustee may accept office or a settlor may revoke or amend a
revocable trust by any method indicating the necessary intent.2" The Code also
expresses a preference for the approach under what might be termed the betterdrafted document." For example, many trust documents allow a trustee to
resign following notice to a specified class ofbeneficiaries. Under the UTC, the
specified class ofbeneficiaries is known as the "qualified beneficiaries," 3 and
a trustee may resign by giving notice to that group.2" 4 The UTC also expresses
a preference for resolving disputes outside of court. The Code contains a
comprehensive provision on nonjudicial settlements.2"' This philosophy also
applies to matters of procedure. A trustee may transfer the principal place of
administration upon notice to the qualified beneficiaries and without approval
of a court;21 6 absent a successor appointment in the terms ofthe trust, a successor
trustee may be appointed upon unanimous agreement of the qualified
beneficiaries.217
Among the more difficult procedural provisions to draft was Section 703,
the Section on relations among cotrustees. While appointment of cotrustees is
common and offers significant benefits, the situations under which cotrustees are
appointed are so varied that designing appropriate default rules is difficult.
Given this difficulty, specifying the powers, duties, and divisions of
responsibilities among cotrustees is among the more important issues to address

any cotrustee. A resigning trustee also may follow the traditional method and resign with
approval of the court.
211. See UTC § 602(c)(2) (revocation); UTC § 701(a)(2) (acceptance).
212. For an explanation of this approach, see Mary Louise Fellows, In Search of
Donative Intent, 73 IOWA L. REV. 611 (1988).
213. See UTC § 103(12) (defining "qualified beneficiaries") (discussedsupranote
85 and accompanying text).
214. UTC §705 (discussed supra note 210 and accompanying text).
215. UTC § 111 (discussed supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text).
216. UTC § 108 (discussed supra notes 77-87 and accompanying text).
217. UTC § 704 (discussed supra note 209 and accompanying text).
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in drafting.2 18 Yet, this issue is often neglected. Among the matters the trust
instrument should address are the following:

o Would the settlor have preferred that the cotrustees act by majority or
unanimity? The UTC opts for efficiency by allowing the cotrustees to act
by majority;219
o To what extent did the settlor intend to allow cotrustees to delegate
responsibilities to each other? The UTC allows a cotrustee to delegate to
the other trustee responsibilities the settlor did not expect the cotrustee to

218. Cotrustees are appointed for a variety ofreasons. Having multiple decisionmakers serves as a safeguard against eccentricity or misconduct. Cotrustees are often
appointed to gain the advantage of differing skills, perhaps a financial institution for its
permanence and professional skills, and a family member to maintain a personal
connection with the beneficiaries. On other occasions, cotrustees are appointed to make
certain that all family lines are represented in the trust's management.
Cotrusteeship should not be called for without careful reflection. Division of
responsibility among cotrustees is often confused, the accountability of any individual
trustee is uncertain, obtaining consent of all trustees can be burdensome, and, unless an
odd number of trustees is named, deadlocks requiring court resolution can occur.
Potential problems can be reduced by addressing division ofresponsibilities in the terms
of the trust. Like the other sections of this Article, Section 703 is freely subject to
modification in the terms of the trust. See UTC § 105 (discussed supranotes 69-76 and
accompanying text).
219. UTC Section 703(a), which is in accord with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 39 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999), rejects the common law rule, followed in
earlier Restatements, that required unanimity among the trustees ofanoncharitable trust.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 194 (1959). In adopting a majority rule
approach, the UTC is following the lead of numerous, if not a majority of, states that
have enacted statutes reversing the unanimity requirement for the trustees of
noncharitable trusts. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTRUSTS § 39 cmt. a & reporter's note
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999). Allowing for action by a majority permits administration
to proceed without the delay inherent in having to seek unanimity, particularly if a
cotrustee is not readily available. Settlors who prefer that trustees act unanimously may
so provide in the terms of the trust. See UTC § 105 (discussed supra notes 69-76 and
accompanying text).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/2
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perform personally.22 The standard is appropriate but may be difficult to
apply in practice;
0 To what extent should a nonparticipating cotrustee be liable for another
trustee's breach? The UTC generally immunizes a nonparticipating trustee
from liability. 2 ' However, the Code also assumes that the settlor did not
intend for the trustee totally to neglect duties. Each trustee must exercise
reasonable care to: (1) prevent a cotrustee from committing a serious
breach of trust; and (2) compel a cotrustee to redress a serious breach of
222
trust.

K. Trustee Removal (Section 7 06)'
Trustees in many states may be removed only for breach of trust or other
untoward act. This standard gives great weight to the settlor's particular
selection of trustee. Because trust instruments typically place weight on a
trustee's judgment and exercise of discretion, the particular trustee selected

220. *UTC § 703(e). This standard differs from the standard for delegation to an
agent as provided in Section 807. Section 807, which is identical to Section 9 of the
Uniform Prudent Investor Act, recognizes that many trustees are not professionals.
Consequently, trustees should be encouraged to delegate functions they are not
competent to perform. Section 703(e), on the other hand, is premised on the assumption
that the settlor selected cotrustees for a specific reason and that this reason ought to
control the scope of a permitted delegation to a cotrustee. Section 703(e) prohibits a
trustee from delegating to another trustee functions the settlor reasonably expected the
trustees to perform jointly. The exact extent to which a trustee may delegate functions
to another trustee in a particular case will vary depending on the reasons the settlor
decided to appoint cotrustees. The better practice is to address the division of functions
in the terms of the trust, as allowed by Section 105. See supra notes 69-76 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of a famous case in which unlimited delegation
among cotrustees contributed to trust mismanagement, see Edward C. Halbach, Jr.,
Foreword: Symposium Issue on the Bishop Estate Controversy,21 U. HAW. L. REV. 1,
7 (1999).
221. UTC § 703(f) (providing that a trustee who does not join in an action of
another trustee is not liable for the action).
222. UTC § 703(g) (codifying the substance of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTRUSTS
§§ 184, 224 (1959)). Unless absolved from this responsibility in the terms of the trust,
the duty to monitor the actions of a cotrustee applies even to functions the trustee has
properly delegated to a cotrustee.
223. For an analysis of this provision from a contractual perspective, see Ronald
Chester & Sarah Reid Ziomek, Removal ofCorporateTrustees Underthe Uniform Trust
Code and Other Current Law: Does a ContractualLense Help Clarify the Rights of
Beneficiaries?,67 Mo. L. REV. 241 (2002).
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becomes an important term of the trust, a term that should not easily be
changed.n 4 The UTC follows traditional doctrine by authorizing a trustee to be
removed for acts of misconduct or other disqualification.' Acts ofmisconduct
or other disqualification justifying removal of the trustee include serious breach
of trust,6 unfitness, and unwillingness or persistent failure to perform the
function effectively. 7 A trustee also may be removed if lack of cooperation
substantially impairs the trust's administration.' Removal for serious breach

224. It traditionallyhas been more difficult to remove a trustee named by the settlor
than a trustee named by the court, particularly if the settlor at the time of the appointment
was aware of the trustee's failings. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 37 cmt. f
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 107 cmts. f-g
(1959). Because of the settlor's interest in seeing that the settlor's intent is properly
carried out, the Code grants the settlor standing to petition for removal of the trustee.
UTC § 706(a).
225. UTC § 706(b)(1), (3). The grounds for removal specified in Section 706(b)
are similar to those found in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 37 cmt. e (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 1999). While removal of a trustee can be regulated in the terms ofthe trust,
the court retains inherent equity authority to remove a trustee ifnecessary in the interests
ofjustice. See UTC § 105(b)(13).
226. UTC § 706(b)(1) (consistent with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 37
cmts. e & g (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999)). UTC § 706(b)(1) makes clear that not every
breach oftrust justifies removal of the trustee. The breach must be "serious." A serious
breach of trust may consist of a single act that causes significant harm or involves
flagrant misconduct. A serious breach of trust also may consist of a series of smaller
breaches, none of which individually justify removal when considered alone, but which
do so when considered together.
227. UTC § 706(b)(3). "Unfitness" may include not only mental incapacity but
also lack ofbasic ability to administer the trust. Before removing a trustee for unfitness,
the court should consider the extent to which the problem might be cured by a delegation
offinctions the trustee is personally incapable ofperforming. "Unwillingness" includes
not only cases where the trustee refuses to act but also a pattern of indifference to some
or all of the beneficiaries. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 37 cmt. e (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 1999). A "persistent failure to administer the trust effectively" might
include a long-term pattern of mediocre performance, such as consistently poor
investment results when compared to similar trusts.
228. UTC § 706(b)(2). Lack of cooperation among trustees justifying a trustee's
removal need not involve a breach of trust. The standard instead is whether the
administration of the trust is significantly impaired by the trustees' failure to agree.
Removal is particularly appropriate if the naming of an even number of trustees,
combined with their failure to agree, has resulted in deadlock requiring court resolution.
The court may remove one or more or all of the trustees. While friction between trustees
may justify removal, friction between the trustee and beneficiaries is ordinarily
insufficient. However, removal might be justified if a communications breakdown is
caused by the trustee or appears to be incurable. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS
§ 37 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999).
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of trust or lack of cooperation among the cotrustees requires no additional
findings. Removal for unfitness, unwillingness, or persistent failure to
administer the trust effectively requires that the court also find that removal
would best serve the interests of the beneficiaries?
"Interests of the
beneficiaries," a defined term, means the beneficial interests provided in the
terms of the trust?230
But the drafters of the UTC also concluded that in situations where the
personal link between the settlor and trustee has been broken, the emphasis
should turn to whether the particular trustee is appropriate to the trust, not
whether the trustee has committed particular acts of misconduct or is totally
unfit. Consequently, in deciding whether to remove the trustee, the court may
consider whether there has been a substantial change of circumstancesp' or if
removal is unanimously requested by the qualified beneficiaries.2 2 Nonetheless,
in neither case may the court remove the trustee unless it also concludes that the
selection of the particular trustee was not a material purpose of the trust, that
removal of the trustee would best serve the interests of the beneficiaries, and that
a suitable cotrustee or successor trustee is available. 3
L. Duty to Keep the BeneficiariesInformed (Section 813)
The duty to keep the beneficiaries reasonably informed of the
administration of the trust is a fundamental duty of a trustee, for only by being
informed can the beneficiaries know of and enforce their interests. Section 813
of the Code codifies this common law obligation, and, at the same time, adds
detail and makes application of the duty more precise. When in doubt, the UTC

229. UTC § 706(b)(3).
230. UTC § 103(7).
231. UTC § 706(b)(4). Changed circumstances justifying removal of a trustee
might include a substantial change in the character of the service or location of the
trustee. A corporate reorganization of an institutional trustee is not itself a change of
circumstances if it does not affect the service provided the individual trust account.
232. UTC § 706(b)(4). The court's ability to take the views of the qualified
beneficiaries into account in deciding whetherto remove thetrustee is a specificbutmore
limited application of Section 411. See supra notes 141-48 and accompanying text.
Section 411 allows the beneficiaries by unanimous agreementto compel modification of
a trust if the court concludes that the particular modification is not inconsistent with a
material purpose of the trust. Section 706(b)(4) similarly allows the qualified
beneficiaries to request removal of the trustee if the designation of the trustee was not a
material purpose of the trust. Under Section 706(b)(4), before removing the trustee, the
court also must find that removal will best serve the interests ofthe beneficiaries and that
a suitable cotrustee or successor trustee is available.
233. UTC § 706(b)(4).
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favors disclosure to beneficiaries as being the better policy. The UTC imposes
both a general obligation on the trustee to keep the qualified beneficiaries
reasonably informed of administration"' and several specific notice
requirements. 5 Nonqualified beneficiaries are entitled to information from the
trustee only upon a specific request. By focusing on disclosure to those
beneficiaries most likely to receive distributions, the Code hopefully will
increase trustee accountability, while at the same time relieving the trustee of the
undue burden of having to identify and notify those holding truly remote
interests.
A trustee is required to notify the qualified beneficiaries of the trustee's
acceptance of officeP 6 and of any change in the method for computing or the
rate of the trustee's compensation. 7 Regular reporting by the trustee is

234. UTC § 813(a). The trustee must keep the qualified beneficiaries reasonably
informed about the administration of the trust and of the material facts necessary for them
to protect their interests. This requires that the trustee communicate to a qualified
beneficiary information about the administration ofthe trust that is reasonably necessary
to enable the beneficiary to enforce the beneficiary's rights and to prevent or redress a
breach of trust. UTC § 813 cmt.; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173 cmt. c
(1959). The general obligation articulated in Section 813(a) is ordinarily satisfied by
providing the beneficiary with a copy of the annual report mandated by Section 813(c).
However, special circumstances may dictate that the trustee provide additional
information. For example, if the trustee is dealing with the beneficiary on the trustee's
own account, the trustee must communicate material facts relating to the transaction that
the trustee knows or should know. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173 cmt.
d (1959). Furthermore, to enable the beneficiaries to take action to protect their interests,
the trustee may be required to provide advance notice of transactions involving real
estate, closely-held business interests, and other assets that are difficult to value or to
replace. See In re Green Charitable Trust, 431 N.W.2d 492, 500 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988);
Allard v. Pac. Nat'l Bank, 663 P.2d 104, 110 (Wash. 1983).
235. UTC § 813(b)-(c).
236. UTC § 813(b). To enable beneficiaries to protect their interests effectively,
it is essential that they know the identity of the trustee. Subsection (b)(2) requires that
a trustee inform the qualified beneficiaries within sixty days ofthe trustee's acceptance
of office, and of the trustee's name, address, and telephone number. Similar to the
obligation imposed on a personal representative following admission of the will to
probate, Subsection (b)(3) requires the trustee of a revocable trust to inform the qualified
beneficiaries of the trust's existence within sixty days after the settlor's death. UTC §
813(b)(3). These two duties can overlap. If the death of the settlor also happens to be
the occasion for the appointment of a successor trustee, the new trustee of the formerly
revocable trust would need to inform the qualified beneficiaries both of the trustee's
acceptance and of the trust's existence. UTC § 813 cmt.
237. UTC § 813(b)(4). Changes can include changes in a periodic base fee, rate
of percentage compensation, hourly rate, termination fee, or transaction charge. The
Code does not specify a trustee's compensation other than that it must be reasonable. See
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/2
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required. Unless the beneficiary has waived its receipt z3 the trustee must
furnish the current beneficiaries, at least annually, with a report of the trust
property, liabilities, receipts, and disbursements, including the source and
amount ofthe trustee's compensation. 9 The trustee also must promptly respond
to any beneficiary's request for information, unless unreasonable under the
circumstances.2'
This includes a requirement that the trustee provide a

UTC § 708(a).
238. UTC § 813(d). Section 813(d) allows trustee reports and other required
information to be waived by a beneficiary. A beneficiary also may withdraw a consent
with respect to future reports and other information. UTC § 813(d). A waiver of a
trustee's report or other information, however, does not relieve the trustee from
accountability and potential liability for matters that the report or other information
would have disclosed. UTC § 813 cmt.
239. UTC § 813(c). Section 813(c) defines the current beneficiaries as the
"distributees or permissible distributees of trust income or principal." Mandatory
reporting is limited to the current beneficiaries because they are most likely to have the
greatest interest in the day-to-day activities of the trust. Section 813(c), however,
provides that any otherbeneficiary, upon request, is entitled to a copy ofa report. Unless
a cotrustee remains in office, the former trustee also must provide a report to all of the
qualified beneficiaries upon that trustee's resignation or removal. If the vacancy
occurred because of the former trustee's death or adjudication of incapacity, a report
may, but need not, be provided by the former trustee's personal representative,
conservator, or guardian. UTC § 813 cmt. The drafters concluded that the resignation
or removal of a trustee was a significant enough event that all qualified beneficiaries
should receive a report, not merely those currently entitled to distributions. The
termination of the trust is also a significant event, but, in that case, the current and
qualified beneficiaries are the same, negating the need for special statutory language.
The Code employs the term "report" instead of"accounting" in order to negate any
inference that the report must be prepared in any particular format or with a high degree
of formality. Section 813(c), however, requires, at a minimum, that the report indicate
the trust's liabilities, receipts, disbursements, including the source and amount of the
trustee's compensation, and list the trust assets and, if feasible, their respective market
values.
240. UTC § 813(a). Requiring that the trustee respond to a beneficiary's request
for information is premised on the assumption that the beneficiary should be allowed to
make an independent assessment of what information is relevant to protecting the
beneficiary's interest. But, not all requests need be honored. A request may be
unreasonable in terms of the volume of information requested, the speed with which the
beneficiary expects aresponse, andtherelevance to thebeneficiary's particularbeneficial
interest. The requirement that a trustee respond to a beneficiary's request applies to all
beneficiaries and not merely to those holding qualified interests. This requirement is
premised on the assumption that all beneficiaries have a right to information necessary
to protect their interests, particularly if they have demonstrated sufficient attention to
have formulated arequest. However, the likelihood that arequestingbeneficiary actually
will receive a distribution from the trust may affect the degree to which the trustee must
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beneficiary upon request with a copy of the trust instrument.24 The drafting
committee rejected the more limited approach of letting the trustee decide which
provisions are material to the beneficiary's interest; the trustee's version ofwhat
is material may differ markedly from what the beneficiary might find relevant.
Requiring disclosure of the entire instrument upon demand is consistent with
recent case law.242 Like most provisions of the Code, however, the requirement
that the beneficiary be furnished with a copy of the entire trust instrument may
be waived in the terms of the trust2 3
The most discussed issue during the drafting of the UTC and subsequent to
its approval is the extent to which a settlor may waive the above disclosure
requirements. Most of the specific disclosure requirements are waivable. Not
waivable is the trustee's obligation to notify the qualified beneficiaries of an
irrevocable trust who are age twenty-five or older of the existence of the trust,
of the identity of the trustee, and of the right to request trustee's reports. 2 " With
respect to any beneficiary regardless of age, the settlor of an irrevocable trust
also may not waive the trustee's obligation to respond to a request for a trustee's
report and other information reasonably related to the trust's administration."4
In other words, if a beneficiary finds out about the trust and makes a request for
information, the trustee must respond to the request even if the trustee was not
obligated to inform the beneficiary about the trust in the first instance.
Early indications are that some of the states that will enact the UTC will
modify the waiver provision. One alternative being discussed is to eliminate or
lower the age twenty-five limit, making the obligation to inform the beneficiaries
of the trust's existence applicable to all beneficiaries or all adult beneficiaries.
Another alternative is to allow a settlor to waive notice to remainder
beneficiaries regardless of age. Yet another response is to permit a settlor to

respond.
241. UTC § 813(b)(1).
242. See Taylor v. Nationsbank Corp., 481 S.E.2d 358, 362 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997);
Fletcher v. Fletcher 480 S.E.2d 488, 491 (Va. 1997). While consistent with recent case
law, the UTC is more expansive than the Commissioners' previous pronouncement on
the topic. UPC Section 7-303(b), which was approved in 1969, requires that the trustee
disclose only those terms that describe or affect the beneficiary's interest.
243. UTC § 105(b)(8). Disclosure of the instrument or of particular provisions,
however, still may be required if the beneficiary can establish eligibility under some
other provision, such as Section 105(b)(9) (qualified beneficiary entitled to information
reasonably related to the administration of the trust) or Section 105(b)(13) (court may
take such action and exercise such jurisdiction as may be necessary in the interests of
justice). UlTC § 105(b)(9)-(13).

244. UTC § 105(b)(8).
245. UTC § 105(b)(9).
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direct a trustee to keep silent about the trust even in the face ofa specific request
by a beneficiary for information.
The waiver issue brings into direct conflict the goal of effectuating settlor
intent with the goal of making certain the beneficiaries have sufficient
information to enforce their interests. The result is a compromise on which some
on both sides of the issue will not be satisfied. Restricting a settlor's ability to
limit disclosure is not a new concept,2' but reducing the matter to the form of a
statute brings the issue into much sharper relief.

M. Remediesfor Breach of Trust (Sections 1001-1009)
The UTC contains comprehensive provisions both specifying and, at the
same time, limiting a trustee's liability for breach of trust. The measure of
damages for breach of trust is designed to restore the trust property and
distributions to what they would have been had the breach not occurred. But it
also serves another purpose-to prevent the trustee from profiting from the
breach. Consequently, under the Code, the trustee is liable for the higher of the
two amounts: the profit made by the trustee or the loss to the trust.247 Also
246. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173 cmt. c (1959). This comment
states:

Although the terms ofthe trust may regulate the amount ofinformation which
the trustee must give and the frequency with which it must be given, the
beneficiary is always entitled to such information as is reasonably necessary
to enable him to enforce his rights under the trust or to prevent or redress a
breach of trust.
247. UTC § 1002(a) (based on RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT
INVESTOR RULE § 205 (1992)). For purposes of Sections 1002 and 1003, "profit" does
not include the trustee's compensation. UTC § 1002 cmt. A trustee who has connitted
a breach of trust is entitled to reasonable compensation for administering the trust unless
the court reduces or denies the trustee compensation pursuant to Section 1001(b)(8).
For extensive commentary on the determination of damages, traditionally known
as trustee surcharge, with numerous specific applications, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE §§ 205-213 (1992). See also GEORGE TAYLOR
BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 862 (rev. 2d ed. 1995); 3 AUSTIN
WAKEMAN SCOTT &WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THELAWOFTRUSTS § 205 (4th ed.
1987). Potential damages may include recovery of lost income, capital gain, or
appreciation that would have resulted from proper administration. For the use of
benchmark portfolios to determine damages, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS:
PRUDENT INVESTORRULE §§ 205 & 208-11 reporter's notes (1992). On the authority of
a court of equity to reduce or excuse damages for breach of trust, see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205 cmt. g (1959). The fact that the beneficiaries hold the trustee
liable for the results of a breach of trust does not relieve the trustee of the duty to
continue to administer the trust properly, nor does it preclude a court from granting any
other relief that it deems appropriate.
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provided are a series of non-monetary remedies, including such actions as
recovery of trust assets misappropriated by a trustee.' Finally, similar to any
other action sounding in equity, the Code authorizes the court, in any proceeding
involving the trust's administration, to award counsel fees to any party, to be
paid by another party or directly from the trust as justice and equity may
24 9
require.
The UTC contains a series of provisions limiting a trustee's exposure to
liability. Following the sending of a trustee's annual or other report, a

248. UTC § 1001 (b). To remedy a breach of trust that has occurred or may occur,
the court may compel the trustee to perform the trustee's duties; enjoin the trustee from
committing a breach of trust; compel the trustee to redress a breach of trust by paying
money, restoring property, or other means; order a trustee to account; appoint a special
fiduciary to take possession of the trust property and administer the trust; suspend the
trustee; remove the trustee as provided in Section 706 (discussed supranotes 223-33 and
accompanying text); reduce or deny compensation to the trustee; void an act of the
trustee; impose a lien or a constructive trust on trust property; or trace trust property
wrongfully disposed of and recover the property or its proceeds. UTC § 1001(b). The
court also may order any other appropriate relief. UTC § 1001(b)(10). The remedies
identified in Section 1001 are derived from RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 199
(1959).
249. UTC § 1004. This Section, which is based on Massachusetts General Laws
Chapter 215, Section 45, codifies the court's historic authority to award costs and fees,
including reasonable attorney's fees, in judicial proceedings grounded in equity. UTC
§ 1004 cmt. Unlike in actions in law, a court of equity is not restrained by the so-called
"American Rule," which provides that the parties are responsible for payment of their
own attorneys' fees, regardless of the outcome of the litigation. In connection with a
judicial proceeding concerning the administration ofa trust, the court may award a party
its own fees and costs from the trust. The court also may charge a party's costs and fees
against another party to the litigation. UTC § 1004 cmt.
Despite this broad authority, courts of equity generally have charged fees against
another party only in the case of egregious conduct, such as bad faith or fraud. Far more
common is the awarding of fees from the trust fund itself. UTC Section 709 authorizes
a trustee to recover expenditures properly incurred in the administration of the trust,
which may include the fees of the trustee's attorney. With respect to the beneficiary, the
court may order the beneficiary's attorney's fees reimbursed from the trust if, applying
what is usually known as the "common fund" theory, the litigation was deemed
beneficial to the trust. Frequently, the litigation brought by a beneficiary will concern
the proper interpretation of the terms of the trust. On other occasions, the litigation will
involve an allegation that the trustee has committed a breach of trust. On still other
occasions, the suit may concern the trustee's failure to take action against a third party,
such as to recover property properly belonging to the trust. For the authority of a
beneficiary to bring an action when the trustee fails to take action against a third party,
see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 281-282 (1959). For the case law on the
award of attorney's fees and other litigation costs, see 3 SCOTT &FRATCHER, supranote
247, § 188.4.
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beneficiary must commence an action for breach of trust within one year but
only if the report adequately disclosed the existence of a potential claim for
breach of trust and informed the beneficiary of the time limit.10 Should the
trustee not report or inadequately disclose, the beneficiary must commence an
action within five years after the termination of the trust, the termination of the
beneficiary's interest, or the date the particular trustee complained of leaves
office."' A beneficiary who has consented to a trustee's action is also precluded
from suing for breach of trust. 52

250. UTC § 1005(a). The drafters rejected the approach followed in some states
that the statute begins to run only upon the filing of a final report or other termination of
the trust relationship. Pursuant to Section 1005(b), a report adequately discloses the
existence of a potential claim for breach of trust if it provides sufficient information so
that the beneficiary or representative knows of the potential claim or should have
inquired into its existence. The representative referred to is the person who may
represent and bind a beneficiary as provided in Article 3, discussed supra notes 96-111
and accompanying text. With respect to the beneficiary's obligation to inquire into a
potential claim, a mere "general feeling of suspicion" of how the trustee is handling the
trust is not sufficient to trigger the obligation. See, e.g., Deutsch v. Wolff, 994 S.W.2d
561, 572 (Mo. 1999).
251. UTC § 1005(c). The five-year statute is intended to provide some ultimate
repose for actions against a trustee. It applies only if the trustee has failed to report, the
report does not contain adequate disclosure, or the report fails to wam of the one-year
time limit. The five-year statute will commence to run on the termination of the trustee's
or beneficiary's relationship with the trust. See UTC § 1005(c). Ordinarily, this will be
the date that the trust terminated, but it also can be earlier. If a trustee leaves office prior
to the termination of the trust, the limitations period for actions against that particular
trustee begins to run on the date the trustee leaves office. UTC § 1005(c)(1). If a
beneficiary receives a final distribution prior to the date the trust terminates, the
limitations period for actions by that particular beneficiary begins to run on the date of
final distribution. UTC § 1005(c)(2).
If a trusteeship terminates by reason ofdeath, a claim against the trustee's estate for
breach of fiduciary duty, like other claims against the trustee's estate, would be barred
by a probate creditor's claim statute even though the statutory period prescribed by this
Section has not yet expired. UTC § 1005 cmt.
252. UTC § 1009. The immunity provided by this Section does not apply if the
beneficiary's consent, release, or ratification was induced by improper conduct of the
trustee, or, if at the time of the consent, release, or ratification, the beneficiary did not
know of the beneficiary's rights or of the material facts relating to the breach. UTC §
1009.
Section 1009 is based on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 216-218 (1959).
UTC § 1009 crnt. The consent of a beneficiary may be given by a person authorized to
represent the beneficiary as provided in Article 3, discussed supra notes 96-111 and
accompanying text. A beneficiary's consent, release, or affirmance may occur either
before or after the approved conduct. UTC § 1009 cmt. Section 1009 requires an
affirmative actby the beneficiary. A failure to object is not sufficient. UTC § 1009 cmt.;
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Even if the terms of the trust attempt to exculpate a trustee completely for
the trustee's acts, the trustee always must comply with a certain minimum
standard. An exculpatory term cannot be used to immunize a trustee for breach
of trust if the breach was committed in bad faith or with reckless indifference to
the purposes of the trust or the interests of the beneficiaries. 3 Even absent bad
faith or reckless indifference, the term is unenforceable if it was inserted as a
result of the abuse of a confidential or fiduciary relationship between the trustee
and settlor.24
Because of the serious risk of abuse present when a
trustee/scrivener inserts an exculpatory provision into the instrument, the drafting
of such a provision is presumed to be an abuse of a fiduciary or confidential
relationship. To overcome the presumption of abuse, the trustee must establish

see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 216 crnt. a (1959); see also In re Scheib Trust,
457 N.W.2d 4, 9 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990). To constitute a valid consent, the beneficiary
must know of the beneficiary's rights and of the material facts relating to the breach.
UTC § 1009 cmt.; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 216 cmt. k (1959). It is not
necessary that the beneficiary know all details within the trustee's knowledge. Rather,
the trustee should see that the beneficiary is sufficiently informed so that the beneficiary
knows the character of the transaction and is in a position to form an opinion as to its
advisability. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 216 cmt. k (1959). If the
beneficiary's approval involves a self-dealing transaction, the approval is binding only
if the transaction was fair and reasonable. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§

170(2), 216(3) cmt. n (1959). A beneficiary is also not bound if the approval was
induced by the trustee's improper conduct. Invalidating conduct includes fraud, duress,
undue influence, misrepresentation, or other abuse of the trustee's fiduciary relationship.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 216 cmt. I (1959); see also Clayton v. James
B. Clow & Sons, 154 F. Supp. 108, 116-17 (N.D. Il. 1957).
253. UTC § 1008(a)(1). This test is consistent with the standard expressed in
Section 105(b)(2), which provides that the terms of the trust may not dispense with the
trustee's obligation to act in good faith and-in accordance with the purposes of the trust.
UTC § 105(b)(2). It is consistent with Section 814(a), which provides that a trustee must
exercise a discretionary power over distributions in good faith and in accordance with the
terms and purposes of the trust and the interests of the beneficiaries. Section 1008(a) is
also similar to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 222 (1959). Unlike the
Restatement,however, the Code does not allow a settlor to exculpate a trustee for a profit
that the trustee made from the trust. For the law on exculpatory provisions generally,
see Robert Whitman, Exoneration Clauses in Wills and Trust Instruments, 4 HOFSTRA
PROP. L.J. 123 (1992).
254. UTC § 1008(a)(2). In determining whether the clause was inserted as the
result of an abuse of a fiduciary or confidential relationship, the court may wish to
examine: (1) the extent of the prior relationship between the settlor and trustee; (2)
whether the settlor received independent advice; (3) the sophistication of the settlor with
respect to business and fiduciary matters; (4) whether the insertion of the provision was
due to undue influence or other improper conduct; (5) the trustee's reasons for inserting
the clause; and (6) the scope of the particular provision inserted. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 222 cmt. d (1959).
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that the clause was fair, and that its existence and contents were adequately
communicated to the settlor. 5
A trustee is entitled to rely on the trust instrument. While the entire terms
of a trust are normally contained in the trust instrument, extrinsic evidence may
be admissible to clarify ambiguities, many of which may not be apparent from
a reading of the instrumerit. 56 Also, grounds may exist, such as reformation due
to a mistake of fact or law, resulting in the reformation of apparently
unambiguous terms.'
To enable a trustee to administer a trust with some
dispatch and without concern that reliance on the language of the trust
instrument is misplaced, the UTC provides that a trustee is not liable for a breach
of trust to the extent the breach resulted from reasonable reliance on the trust
instrument. 8

255. UTC § 1008(b). The drafters of the Code disapprove of cases such as
Marsman v. Nasca, 573 N.E.2d 1025 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991), which held that an
exculpatory clause in a trust instrument drafted by the trustee was valid because the
beneficiary could not prove that the clause was inserted as a result of an abuse of a
fiduciary relationship. UTC § 1008 crt. For a later case where sufficient proof ofabuse
was present, see Rutanan v. Ballard,678 N.E.2d 133, 140-41 (Mass. 1997). Section
1008(b) responds to the danger that the insertion of such a clause by the fiduciary or its
agent mayhave been undisclosed or inadequately understood by the settlor. UTC § 1008
cmt.
The requirements of Section 1008(b) are satisfied if the settlor was represented by
independent counsel. UTC § 1008 cmt. If the settlor was represented by independent
counsel, the settlor's attorney is considered the drafter of the instrument even if the
attorney used the trustee's form. UTC § 1008 cmt. Because the settlor's attorney is an
agent of the settlor, disclosure of an exculpatory term to the settlor's attorney is
disclosure to the settlor. UTC § 1008 cmt.
256. Pursuant to the definition of "terms of the trust," the terms include not only
expressions in the written trust instrument but also other evidence that would be
admissible in ajudicial proceeding. Oral statements, the situation of the beneficiaries,
the purposes of the trust, the circumstances under which the trust is to be administered,
and, to the extent the settlor was otherwise silent, rules of construction, all may have a
bearing on determining a trust's meaning. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 4
cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 4 cmt. a
(1959). If a trust established by order of court is to be administered as an express trust,
the terms of the trust are determined from the court order as interpreted in light of the
general rules governing interpretation of judgments. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 4 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996).
257. See UTC § 415 (discussed supranotes 155-56 and accompanying text).
258. UTC § 1006. This Section is similar to Section l(b) of the Uniform Prudent
Investor Act, which protects a trustee from liability to the extent that the trustee acted in
reasonable reliance on theprovisions of the trust. UTC § 1006 crnt. A trustee's reliance
on the trust instrument would not bejustified if the trustee is aware ofaprior court decree
or binding nonjudicial settlement agreement clarifying or changing the terms ofthe trust.
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A trustee is also entitled to rely on reasonable inferences as to a
beneficiary's family or other status. Whenever the happening of an event
(including marriage, divorce, performance of education requirements, or death)
affects the administration or distribution of the trust, a trustee who exercised
reasonable care to determine that the event occurred is not liable for any loss
attributable to lack of knowledge. 9

N. Trustee Dealingswith ThirdPersons (Sections 1010-1013)
Third persons, in trust law parlance, are persons other than trustees and
beneficiaries. These are the persons who purchase property from the trust, sell
property orprovide services to the trust, or otherwise engage in transactions with
the trustee. The law on trustee transactions with third persons is a compromise
of competing policies-the desire to protect the beneficiaries from harm versus
the need to facilitate transactions. The common law, developed in an age when
most trusts consisted largely of real estate and commercial transactions moved
at a slower pace, emphasized beneficiary protection. A trustee was personally
liable on contracts with third persons and could be denied reimbursement even
if the expense was proper.26 In addition, a third person making payment to the
UTC § 1006 cmt.
259. UTC § 1007. This Section, which is based on Washington Revised Code
Section 11.98.100, is designed to encourage trustees to administer trusts expeditiously
and without undue concern about liability for failure to ascertain external facts, often of
a personal nature, that might affect administration or distribution of the trust. The
common law, contrary to this Section, imposed absolute liability against a trustee for
misdelivery regardless of the trustee's level of care. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 226 (1959). The events listed in this Section are not exclusive. A trustee who
has exercised reasonable care to ascertain the occurrence of other events, such as the
attainment by a beneficiary of a certain age, is also protected from liability.
Frequently, exercising reasonable efforts will require the trustee to make inquiries
into a beneficiary's status. For example, in the well-known case of NationalAcademy
ofSciences v. Cambridge Trust Co., 346 N.E.2d 879 (Mass. 1976), the trust provided for
continuing payments to the testator's widow but with the payments to terminate upon her
remarriage. In surcharging the trustee for continuing to make payments following the
widow's remarriage, the court found that, despite the widow's many different addresses,
the trustee had made no effort whatsoever to inquire into the widow's marital status.
260. At common law, a trustee was personally liable on all contracts whether or not
the trustee's fiduciary office was disclosed to the other contracting party. The trustee
then could look to the trust estate for reimbursement. But if the trust estate was
insufficient to reimburse the trustee, the trustee was liable for the deficiency even if the
trustee's actions were proper. Only if personal liability was specifically negated in the
contract was it certain that the third party could look only to the trust for payment. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 246, 262, 263 (1959); Jerome J. Curtis, Jr., The
Transmogrificationof the American Trust, 31 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 251,277-80
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trustee could be held responsible for the trustee's misapplication, regardless of
whether the third person was at fault.26 The result was careful scrutiny by third
persons of the terms of the trust and an approach of caution when dealing with
a trustee. The overall effect was the chilling of transactions. Why bother
transacting with a trustee when one can make the same deal elsewhere without
the same risks and restrictions.
The provisions of the UTC addressing trustee relations with third persons
are built on the premise that third persons should approach transactions with
trustees the same way they approach any other commercial deal. The theory is
that trust beneficiaries are helped more by the free flow of commerce than they
were by the largely ineffective protective features of former law. Under the
Code, a trustee is not personally liable on contracts as long as the trustee
disclosed the fiduciary capacity 62 and is personally liable for torts committed in
administering the trust only if the trustee was personally at fault.2' A trustee is
protected from personal liability for contract and tort liability of partnerships in

(1996).
261. See 4 SCOTr & FRATCHER, supranote 145, § 321.
262. UTC § 1010(a). This Section is derived from Section 7-306 of the UPC,

approved in 1969. UTC § 1010 cmt. Like the UPC, Section 1010 reverses the common
law rules with the aim of facilitating a trustee's transactions with third persons.
Section 1010 is built on two assumptions. First, it is awkward and unnecessaryto
require a third party to sue a trustee personally, and then require that the trustee seek
indemnification from the trust. Rather, it is more efficient if the third party can sue the
trustee in a fiduciary capacity. Consequently, Section 1010(c) provides that ajudicial
proceeding against thetrustee, maybe assertedin ajudicial proceeding against the trustee
in the trustee's fiduciary capacity, whether or not the trustee is personally liable for the
claim.
Second, the drafters of the Code assumed that the best course is to hold a trustee
personally liable for dealings with third parties only if the third party was somehow
misled. Section 1010(a) negates a trustee's personal liability on contracts ifthe fiduciary
capacity was disclosed in the contract. This can be evidenced simply by the trustee
signing as trustee. Unlike Section 7-306 of the UPC, there is no requirement that the
contract specifically identify the trust. However, the protection afforded the trustee
applies only to contracts that are properly entered into in the trustee's fiduciary capacity,
meaning that the trustee is exercising an available power and not violating a duty.
263. UTC § 1010(b). The common law also imposed onerous responsibilities on
a trustee for torts and for liabilities arising from ownership ofproperty. The trustee was
personally liable for a tort committed during the course of administration and for
liabilities arising from holding title to property, such as the obligation to pay real estate
taxes. In either case, the trustee could look to the trust for reimbursement. However,
should the trust assets prove inadequate, the trustee was required personally to pay any
deficiency resulting from liability in tort. Only in the case of liability arising from
holding title to property was the third party prevented from recovering a deficiency from
the trustee. See RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 244,247,264,265 (1959).
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which the trustee is a general partner.2" Persons dealing with a trustee in good
faith and for value need not inquire into the extent of the trustee's powers and
are protected as if the trustee was acting properly.265 Finally, to protect the

264. UTC § 1011. The objective of this Section, which is modeled after Ohio
Revised Code Section 1339.65, is to immunize the trustee of a trust that holds an interest
in a partnership from personal liability for contracts that the partnership has entered into
and for torts that agents of the partnership may have committed. Section 1010 does not
offer such protection, immunizing a trustee only from the trustee's own contracts or torts,
not the contracts or torts of an entity in which the trust has an ownership interest. Section
1011 is limited to interests as a general partner. Special protection is not needed for other
business interests that the trustee may own, such as an interest as a limited partner, a
membership interest in a limited liability corporation, or an interest as a corporate
shareholder. In those cases, the nature of the entity or the interest owned by the trustee
carries with it its own limitation on liability. UTC § 1011 cmt.
Section 1011 was placed in brackets to alert enacting jurisdictions to consider
modifying it to conform to the state's specific laws on partnerships and other forms of
unincorporated businesses. UTC § 1011 cmt.
265. UTC § 1012. This Section, which is derived from Section 7 of the Uniform
Trustee Powers Act, provides protections for persons other than beneficiaries who have
dealings with a trustee. The objective is to treat persons dealing with a trustee the same
as if they were engaged in a transaction not involving trust property. Section 1012(a)
codifies the bona fide purchaser rule. A person other than a beneficiary who in good
faith assists a trustee, or who in good faith and for value deals with a trustee, without
knowledge that the trustee is exceeding or improperly exercising the trustee's powers is
protected from liability as if the trustee properly exercised the power.
Section 1012(b) negates a duty ofinquiry. A person other than the beneficiary who
in good faith deals with a trustee is not required to inquire into the extent of the trustee's
powers or the propriety oftheir exercise. The third party may assume that the trustee has
the necessary power. Consequently, there is no need to request or examine a copy of the
trust instrument. Section 1012(b), and the comparable provisions enacted in numerous
states, are intended to negate the rule, followed by some courts, that a third party is
charged with constructive notice of the trust instrument and its contents. The cases are
collected in GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 897 (rev. 2d ed. 1995), and 4 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supranote
145, § 297. That approach stemmed from the premise that the trust beneficiaries'
equitable interests take precedence over the interests of and damages to third parties who
did not bother to inquire into the trustee's authority, even if they were acting in good
faith. See Curtis, supra note 260, at 298-301.
Section 1012(c) negates any obligation to follow property after its delivery to the
trustee. A person who in good faith delivers assets to a trustee need not ensure their
proper application.
Section 1012(d) protects individuals who deal with a trustee without knowledge
that the trusteeship has terminated. A person other than a beneficiary who in good faith
assists a former trustee, or who in good faith and for value deals with a former trustee,
without knowledge that the trusteeship has terminated is protected from liability as ifthe
former trustee were still a trustee. This provision logically follows from the protection
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privacy of the trust's dispositive provisions, the trustee may provide the third
person with a certification of trust in lieu of a copy of the trust instrument. A
certification is a document signed by the trustee reciting the trustee's authority
and containing the portion ofthe trust instrument relevant to the transaction. The
third person is entitled to rely on the statements contained in the certification
without making further inquiry.

2

6

IX. TiE LIMITS OF LEGISLATION
This Article has reviewed the organization and major advances contained
in the UTC. The drafters desire and hope that the Code will be enacted in all
fifty states. The result would be one uniform approach to trust law in the United
States. But there are limits to what legislation can accomplish. Over time,
legislation tends to become obsolete. Updating obsolete legislation is often far
more difficult than securing an original enactment. Minor amendments do not
excite interest, and other issues will enjoy higher legislative priority. Any
attempt to codify the law of trusts comprehensively, therefore, must stand the
test of time and not require constant amendment. The statute must be
sufficiently specific to add content to the rules developed by the courts but yet
not so detailed as quickly to become obsolete as conditions change.

afforded by Section 1012(a), as in both cases the third party is acting in good faith and
without knowledge of the trustee's (or ex-trustee's) impropriety.
Provisions similarto Section 1012 arenotuniqueto statutes involvingtrusts but are
also present in statutes regulating general commerce. To assure maximum uniformity for
those involved in commerce, the more general statute should control in the event of
inconsistency. For this reason, Section 1012(e) provides that the protections provided
by Section 1012 are secondary to and superseded by comparable protective provisions
of other laws relating to commercial transactions orto the transfer ofsecurities. SeeUTC
§ 1012(e). Such other laws would include Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
The Uniform Fiduciaries Act, and the Uniform Simplification of Fiduciary Security
Transfers Act. UTC § 1012 cmt.
266. UTC § 1013. The certification oftrust procedure, which is derived from CAL.
PROB. CODE § 18100.5 (West Supp. 2000), is intended to provide a mechanism for
,maintaining the privacy ofthe trust instrument in situations where a person other than the
beneficiary seeks to verify the trust or the trustee's authority. UTC § 1013 cmt. By
validating the trustee's certification of authority to engage in the transaction, the
objective is to protect the privacy of the trust instrument by discouraging requests by
outside parties for complete copies of the trust instrument in order to verify an often
specific and narrow trustee authority.
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It is hoped that the UTC has met the challenges for a utilitarian,
comprehensive code of law. The drafters have not tried to codify all conceivable
trust law topics. Not all topics are amenable to legislation. Problems are
sometimes too new for workable solutions to have suggested themselves, or
efforts to reduce rules to writing will result in excess rigidity and insufficient
discretion vested in the courts to adapt to changing conditions. Even on issues
the drafters have elected to codify, the UTC, in many cases, does not specify
every possible detail, the drafters preferring flexibility and brevity to greater
precision but probable quick obsolescence. Hopefully, the final result is a Code
that will serve as the model for trust statutes for decades to come.
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